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Research on the statutory license for certain types of copyright-protected content
has revealed an unlikely symbiosis between uncertainty and efficiency. Contrary to
received wisdom, which tells us that in order to increase efficiency, we must increase
stability, this Article suggests that uncertainty can actually be used to increase
efficiency in the marketplace. In the music industry, the battle over terrestrial
performance rights-thatis, the right of a copyright holder to collect royaltiesfor
plays of a sound recording on terrestrial radio-hasraged for decades. In June
2012, in a deal that circumvented the statutory license for sound recordingsfor the
first time ever, broadcasting giant Clear Channel granted an elusive terrestrial
performance right to a small, independent record label named Big Machine and
agreed to pay royalties where no such legal obligation exists. This result not only
improves upon many of the statutory license's inefficiencies but is also the opposite
of what we would expect given both the tumultuous history surrounding the
rights at issue and the respective parties' bargaining positions. It suggests an
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underexplored mechanism at play: uncertainty. Using the statutory license for
sound recordings and the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal to motivate the
analysis, this Article argues that bounded uncertainty-such as uncertainty about
the future legal status of terrestrialperformance rights and uncertainty aboutfuture
digital business models-converts a statutory license into a "penalty default
license." Just as penalty default rules encourage more efficient information
exchange between asymmetrical parties, penalty default licenses encourage more
efficient licensing among otherwise divergent parties by motivating them to
circumvent an inefficient statutory license in favor of private ordering. While not
without its drawbacks, which previous work identified and ameliorated, private
ordering improves upon the statutory approach, resulting in greater efficiency not
only for the parties involved but for society overall. Recognition of the role that
uncertaintyplays in converting an inefficient statutory license into a penalty default
license that improves market efficiency while mitigating inequality has implications
beyond the statutory licensing context. It suggests a revision in the way we view the
relationship between uncertainty and efficiency. Specifically, it shows that when
coupled with a penalty default, uncertainty can bring greater efficiency to the
marketplace by encouraging private ordering-with its tailored terms and
responsiveness to rapid legal and technological change-while mitigating concerns
about inequality and gamesmanship.
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INTRODUCTION

A recent spate of private broadcasting deals has circumvented the
statutory license for sound recordings' for the first time ever and
created a new, private intellectual property right that does not exist
under the current copyright laws: the terrestrial performance right.2
These deals offer unique insight into both the potential gains and the
potential drawbacks of private ordering3 in the shadow of a statutory
regime. They also reveal an unlikely symbiosis between uncertainty
and efficiency that runs contrary to the received wisdom that
efficiency is borne of stability.
It may surprise the reader to learn that his or her favorite
recording artists are not paid when one of their songs is played on a
terrestrial radio station in the United States. This fact has certainly
surprised (and angered) recording artists and copyright holders, 4 who
for the last two decades have fought for a so-called "terrestrial
performance royalty" only to be shut down repeatedly by the
broadcaster lobby.5 When the issue was last before Congress in 2009,

1 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). The statutory license for sound recordings, like other
statutory licenses for copyright-protected content, operates as an "open offer" that may be
"accepted" by any prospective licensee willing to pay the statutory rate and comply with
the statutory terms. As discussed in Part I, many of these statutory licenses for copyrightprotected content are administered by collective rights organizations (CROs), which
function as collective bargaining entities that typically set and enforce a going rate for
individual or blanket licensing of content. See, e.g., About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://

www.soundexchange.comlabout/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (describing one such CRO,
SoundExchange, as an "independent nonprofit performance rights organization that
collects and distributes digital performance royalties to featured artists and copyright
holders").
2 A terrestrial performance right entitles the copyright holder to be paid for public
performance of a sound recording on terrestrial radio. Terrestrial (or "analog") radio
refers to traditional FM/AM radio and also includes hybrid digital (HD) radio. It is distinct
from Internet (or "webcast") radio services like Pandora and satellite radio providers like
SiriusXM.
3 For the purposes of this Article, "private ordering" refers specifically to the
government-induced variety of private ordering around a penalty default license. This form
of private ordering is distinct from conventional private ordering in a free market insofar
as the former operates with the explicit comfort of a safety net, while the latter refers to
private negotiation in an efficient marketplace. However, they share common efficiency
gains, challenges, and drawbacks.
4 The recording artist and the copyright holder are rarely the same party. Most
recording artists assign their copyrights to an intermediary record label (and likewise, most
songwriters assign their copyrights to an intermediary music publisher), which explains
why deals like that between Clear Channel and Big Machine can have pros for the
copyright holder and cons for the artist. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the denial of
statutory royalties distribution to artists as a result of circumventing § 114).
5 Broadcasters have always resisted a terrestrial performance right for sound
recordings on the basis that their programming provides a valuable promotional service to
artists and record labels and, as such, they should not have to pay royalties. The fact that

digital broadcasters-of whom the same could be said-are nonetheless subject to
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Dennis Wharton, then-executive vice president of media relations for
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), called the
Performance Rights Act 6 "the biggest threat to radio in 50 years." 7
Notwithstanding this sentiment, in June 2012 media conglomerate
and content licensee Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (Clear
Channel) granted the elusive terrestrial performance right to
independent record label and content licensor Big Machine Label
Group (Big Machine) in a private deal that circumvented § 114, the
statutory license for sound recordings, and SoundExchange, the
collective rights organization (CRO) charged with collecting and
administering royalties under the statutory license.8 In other words,
one of the nation's largest broadcasting companies agreed to pay
Taylor Swift a share of its advertising revenues where it had no legal
obligation to do so. 9 Many copycat deals followed in short order.' 0
performance royalties serves as but one example of unresolved inconsistencies in this area
of the law.
6 H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009). The Act would have established a terrestrial
performance royalty. Id.
7 Kristina Sherry, Radio Stations Step Up Battle Against Performance Rights Act, L.A.
TIMEs (July 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/03/business/fi-ct-radio3. "For more
than 80 years, commercial stations have aired songs without paying royalties to musicians,
but a bill making its way through Congress would change that." Id.
8 Ed Christman, Clear Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay Sound-Recording
Performance Royalties to Label, Artists, BILLBOARDBIZ (June 5, 2012, 7:00 AM), http:l/
www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industryllegal-and-management/exclusive-clear-channel-bigmachine-strike-1007226762.story. SoundExchange is the sole CRO charged with collection
and administration of digital performance royalties for sound recordings. See About, supra
note 1 ("SoundExchange is the independent nonprofit performance rights organization
that collects and distributes digital performance royalties to featured artists and copyright
holders.").
9 This grant of a terrestrial performance right is significant not only because Clear
Channel had no legal obligation to pay it but also due to the fact that "[t]errestrial radio
still accounts for 98% of U.S. radio's music advertising revenue." Dan Rys, Clear Channel
Inks Second Radio Royalties Label Deal, This Time With Glassnote, BILLBOARDBIZ (Sept.
27, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/radio/clear-channel-inkssecond-radio-royalties-1007962302.story.
10 See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Clear Channel-Warner Music Deal Rewrites the Rules on
Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at B1 (describing the Clear Channel-Warner Music
Group deal); Priscilla Kim, Clear Channel Signs Another Direct Deal with Indie Label,
DIGITAL Music NEws (July 25, 2013), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/
07/25/clearchannelinnovativeleisure (citing a deal between Clear Channel and Innovative
Entertainment as "one of many similar deals with other labels, including agreements with
Big Machine Label Group, Glassnote Entertainment Group, Dualtone, Fearless Records,
and more"); Glenn Peoples, Big Machine Label Group Signs Terrestrial Royalties Deal
with Entercom, BILLBOARDBIZ (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.billboard.bizlbbbiz/
industry/record-labels/big-machine-label-group-signs-terrestrial-1007954192.story
(describing the Big Machine-Entercom deal); Rys, supra note 9 (describing the Clear
Channel-Glassnote deal). Clear Channel is reportedly approaching more labels. Helienne
Lindvall, Should Labels Bypass SoundExchange and Enter into Direct Deals with Clear
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Powerful licensees are circumventing the statutory license to
grant less powerful licensors new, meaningful intellectual property
rights and are thereby incurring payment obligations where no legal
obligation exists. This is significant both for its departure from the
historical deadlock around terrestrial performance rights and because
it runs counter to the parties' respective bargaining positions,
suggesting an unexplored mechanism at work: uncertainty." An
inefficient statutory license, coupled with uncertainty about the future
legal status of terrestrial performance rights and future digital
business models, is providing a powerful impetus for circumvention of
the statutory license through private dealmaking.
In previous work, I identified an emerging phenomenon in which
parties operating under a nonmandatory statutory license were
circumventing the license and instead engaging in private ordering. 12
This brand of private ordering-which I termed "private copyright
reform" 13-brings efficiency advantages vis-A-vis the statutory license,
but it also presents potential distributive justice concerns. 14 Having
addressed those concerns by suggesting two relatively straightforward
statutory amendments,15 I return in this Article to an exploration of
the efficiency advantages of private ordering for certain types of
copyright-protected content.
This investigation reveals uncertainty as an unexpected tool for
improving efficiency. When coupled with a penalty default,
uncertainty can bring greater efficiency to the marketplace by
encouraging private ordering, which allows for tailored terms and
responsiveness to rapid legal and technological change. While scholars
have recognized the behavior-influencing properties of uncertainty, 16
these observations have not identified uncertainty as a means of
Channel?, DIGITAL Music NEWS (May 3, 2013), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2013/05/03/bypass.
11 This Article uses a lay understanding of the word "uncertainty"-i.e., lack of
confidence as to the outcome-as opposed to the economic definition in which the
probability of outcomes cannot be estimated.
12 Kristelia A. Garcfa, Private Copyright Reform, 20 MicH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 1 (2013).
13 Id. at 3.

See id. at 29-37 (discussing these implications).
An amendment making the § 114(g)(2) distribution inalienable would ameliorate
concerns about artists being cut out of deals to which they are not a party, while the
addition of a more robust disclosure requirement for rates presented to the Copyright
Royalty Board would reduce concerns about market misrepresentations. Id. at 32-37.
16 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1518-19 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the
tendency of individuals to underestimate the likelihood of uncertain events in the field of
behavioral economics); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 297 (1992)
14
15
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improving efficiency. Many industries suffer from market inefficiency,
and the copyright-protected content industries-music, film,
television, and publishing-are no exception. Using the recording
industry as a case study in the inefficiencies of a statutory licensing
regime, this Article shows how players in a notoriously unstable
industry are incentivized to make their own efficiency by
circumventing § 114, a de facto penalty default license.
The term "penalty default license," introduced here to describe
the use of bounded uncertainty 7 to induce private ordering, borrows
its name and function from the parallel concept of "penalty default
rules." First introduced by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,18
penalty default rules are unpalatable fallback options in contract law
that kick in unless the parties negotiate their own terms. Such rules
induce more knowledgeable parties to "reveal information by
contracting around the default penalty."1 9 Similarly, the bounded
uncertainty of penalty default licenses encourages more efficient deal
making among otherwise unequal parties by motivating them to
circumvent an inefficient statutory license in favor of private ordering
and the resulting efficiency gains that come from tailored rates and
terms.
The fact that parties in the music industry are circumventing the
relevant statutory license and CRO in favor of private ordering-not
a costless endeavor-signals inefficiency in the statutory regime.
While not without drawbacks, private ordering improves upon the
conventional approach. Unlike the statutory license, private ordering
allows for a predictable outcome tailored to the contemplated content
and use. Just as penalty default rules can encourage more efficient
information exchange between asymmetrical parties, 20 penalty default
(extending a critical view of utility theory as the dominant model of individual decision
making under uncertainty in the field of social psychology).
17 "Bounded uncertainty" means a limited, controlled quantity of uncertainty, such as
uncertainty about the future state of the law or uncertainty over a future statutory rate, as
opposed to complete chaos, which could have precisely the opposite effect on efficiency. In
this Article, "uncertainty" refers to bounded uncertainty.
18 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
19 Id. at 94. In other words, where a default rule results in an undesirable outcome for
Party A (possessor of information unknown to Party B), Party A may be incentivized to
negotiate around the default, thereby revealing his information publicly-not only to Party
B but also to the legislature, which can use that information to draft better rules, default
and otherwise.
20 See id. at 91 (introducing the concept of "penalty defaults" as "designed to give at
least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer").
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licenses can encourage more efficient licensing among otherwise
divergent parties.
Ultimately, this Article has two overarching goals: First, to
propose that the statutory licensing regime for certain types of
copyright-protected content can be made more efficient with penalty
default licenses, and second, to suggest that uncertainty can lead to
greater market efficiency by converting a default into a penalty
default. Where much of the literature focuses on increasing stability
and minimizing uncertainty to improve efficiency, 21 this Article makes
the contrary case: To increase efficiency, legislators may utilize
uncertainty to encourage private ordering under a statutory license.
Awareness of the role uncertainty plays in increasing market
efficiency in the statutory licensing context allows for more refined
consideration of uncertainty generally, as well as its potential
application in other areas of the law. Considerable amounts of time,
money, and effort are spent chasing the elusive goal of stability. 22 The
argument presented here-that uncertainty coupled with a penalty
default might actually increase efficiency-provides a more costeffective and attainable solution to the problem of market
inefficiency.
Part I summarizes the rich literature on defaults and intellectual
property rights that motivates the analysis and forms the basis for the
subsequent case study. Part II analyzes the Clear Channel-Big
Machine deal to show how inefficiencies in § 114 have both led to, and
21 See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The
Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 132 (2012)

("By reducing ...

uncertainty faced by parties in a transaction ...

earnouts can improve

pricing efficiency."); William P. Johnson, The Hierarchy That Wasn't There: Elevating
"Usage" to Its Rightful Position for Contracts Governed by the CISG, 32 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 263, 268 (2012) ("As a consequence of [Uniform Commercial Code] bias, U.S. courts
have utterly failed to recognize the different approach required by the [United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods], leaving businesspersons
engaging in international sales transactions with unnecessary and undesirable uncertainty
regarding the terms of their sales contracts. That uncertainty increases transaction costs
and undermines efficiency."). In the intellectual property context, see, for example, Ben
Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1831, 1862 (2009). In the context of adapting copyright rules to changes in
technology, Professor Depoorter asks, "What initiatives can one undertake to reduce
uncertainty and delay?" Id. at 1862 (emphasis added).
22 For example, legislators, industry players, and scholars have for years debated a
statutory license for music sampling without success. See, e.g., Robert M. Vrana, Note, The
Remix Artist's Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing for Transformative,
Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 814 (2011) (arguing for a
compulsory licensing scheme for musical recordings); George Howard, Should There Be a
Compulsory License for Derivative Works?, TUNECORE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013), http://
blog.tunecore.com/2013/04/should-there-be-a-compulsory-license-for-derivativeworks.html (proposing a compulsory license for derivative works).
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yet do not fully explain, the recent circumvention deals. Specifically, it
demonstrates that private ordering brings predictability, flexibility,
and cooperation to a historically unstable and contentious industry,
while also acknowledging the potentially unsavory impetuses
motivating the parties, including a desire to influence the eventual
statutory rate to the detriment of competitors. It concludes by asking
why, given that the statutory license has always been inefficient, § 114
has not previously been circumvented, a question that the rest of the
Article attempts to answer. Part III discusses the various challenges to
circumvention, possible approaches for overcoming those challenges,
and the potential drawbacks of circumvention. It ultimately proposes
utilizing uncertainty as a sufficiently strong impetus for circumvention.
Part IV makes the case for coupling uncertainty and penalty defaults
in the market context, arguing that together they can induce private
ordering to increase efficiency, while at the same time mitigating
concerns about gamesmanship commonly associated with private
ordering. 23 The Article concludes by demonstrating how this would
apply in the highly controversial sampling context.
I
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Contract doctrine recognizes rules as either immutable or default.
Immutable rules, so named for their inalienability, are typically
implemented where lawmakers seek to protect either parties to a
contract or nonparties outside the contract. 24 Default rules minimize
23 There is often marked disparity in bargaining power between the parties involved in
the licensing of sound recordings. Larger, more powerful parties may take advantage of
their privileged positions in order to game the system-whether by unduly influencing
industry custom or by striking influential deals that disadvantage competitors who are
unable to match terms. These and other forms of gamesmanship are discussed in Part
II.B.2.b.
24 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 87 ("The legal rules of contracts and
corporations can be divided into two distinct classes. The larger class consists of 'default'
rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the smaller, but important,
class consists of 'immutable' rules that parties cannot change by contractual agreement.").
Termination rights for sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), are an example of an
immutable rule established to protect a party-in this case, recording artists-perceived as
vulnerable relative to the record label. Section 203 allows an artist to terminate a grant of
copyright thirty-five years after the date of execution of the grant. Congress established
§ 203 as an immutable rule in an effort to "safeguard[ ] authors against unremunerative
transfers" and to specifically address "the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting
in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited."
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).This right cannot be waived and survives even in the
face of an agreement to the contrary. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may
be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary . . . .").
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transaction costs by mimicking what the parties would have wanted. 25
In this way, parties to a contract are spared the costs associated with
private negotiation, while still achieving their desired outcome.
Penalty default rules set a default that parties would not want in an
effort to encourage them to contract around the default and set their
own (more efficient) terms.26
As a form of contract, statutory licenses fall into these same two
categories. Mandatory compulsory licenses-like § 111 for broadcast
cable and § 119 for satellite television-are immutable.
Circumventable compulsory licenses-like § 114 for sound recordings
and § 115 for musical compositions-are defaults. A default license
that is unpalatable to both parties, such as § 114, is a penalty default.
Just as penalty default rules can encourage more efficient outcomes by
encouraging information exchange among otherwise unequal parties,
so too can penalty default licenses facilitate greater efficiency by
encouraging opt-out and private ordering. This assumes the existence
of a property right-in this case, an intellectual property right-and
borrows from both the liability and property-rights schools of thought
regarding the most efficient means of licensing that right.
Under a liability rights regime, content owners are compensated
ex post (usually in accordance with a statutory rate) and any
prospective licensee willing and able to pay the statutory rate may
While outside the scope of this Article, the protections intended by termination rights
might be better served by conversion to a default. If termination rights were established as
a default instead of an immutable rule, recording artists less concerned with future
earnings than with current earnings would be able to "sell" the right as part of contract
negotiations. In addition to the moral rights argument-i.e., that the artist, not Congress, is
in the best position to decide what is best for him-there is also great value in this kind of
signaling, particularly in the creative industries where the inherent creativity risk is difficult
to hedge. See, e.g., Ricard Gil & Pablo T. Spiller, The Organizational Implications of
Creativity: The U.S. Film Industry in Mid-XXth Century 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13253, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13253 ("Creativity ... generates particular informational asymmetries between creative
talent and management . . . .").
25 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 115-16 (discussing the "mimic-the-market"
approach to default rules). Two commonly recognized categories of defaults are tailored
and untailored: A tailored default aims to give the parties precisely what they would have
contracted for, while an untailored default simply aims for a standard that most parties
would have contracted for. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, PreliminaryThoughts on Optimal Tailoring
of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 1, 4 (1993) ("Untailored ('off-the-rack')
defaults are rule-like because they are contingent on fewer variables, while tailored
defaults are standard-like because they are contingent on more variables concerning the
attributes or conduct of the particular contracting parties.").
26 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 91. Ayres and Gertner see penalty default rules
as useful for filling contractual gaps that can result from information asymmetry and
strategic behavior by contracting parties. Id. They conclude that "a penalty default should
be used if it results in valuable information revelation with low transaction costs." Id. at
128.
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procure a license under standard terms. 27 A property rights regime, in
contrast, requires ex ante negotiation and agreement between licensee
and licensor. 28 A penalty default license blends the two regimes by
setting an unpalatable ex post rate 29 (a liability rule) to force more
efficient ex ante negotiation (a property rule). In other words, the
penalty default licensing regime proposed by this Article uses an
unpalatable liability rule to encourage the substitution of a more
efficient property rule.
Ronald Coase demonstrated that so long as property rights are
well established and transaction costs are negligible, their initial
allocation does not matter because the parties will negotiate among
themselves to reach the maximally efficient allocation.30 Fittingly,
Coase developed his famous theory while working on the problem of
radio frequency regulation.31 In 1959, when Coase was conducting his
research, all radio stations could use the same tuning frequencies,
thereby potentially interfering with each other's broadcasts. 32 Coase
determined that so long as property rights in those frequencies were
well defined (regardless of to whom those property rights were
assigned), the radio station that most highly valued broadcasting on
the frequency at issue would have an incentive to negotiate with (i.e.,
pay) the interfering station(s) to stop using that same frequency. 33 In
other words, in the absence of transaction costs, the individual radio
stations would negotiate among themselves to reach the optimally
efficient allocation of rights. The station with more to gain from the
uninterrupted use of a frequency would pay for its exclusive use, while
the station with more to gain from selling its use of the frequency
27 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972) (defining
liability rules).
28 See id. (defining property rules); Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293,
1302 (1996) (discussing property rules and liability rules in the context of CROs).
29 To avoid gamesmanship, this rate must be unpalatable to both parties, though not
necessarily equally so. Thus, even though a more established party may be better able to
sustain rate uncertainty than a start-up, unpalatability is unpalatability. Both parties simply
need to have something to gain through private negotiation, even if those gains are
disparate. That unpalatability can stem from a variety of factors-in this case, uncertainty
about the future state of the law.
30 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) ("It is
always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of
rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of
rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.").
31 See R.H. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959)
(exploring the Federal Communications Commission's regulation of broadcasting).
32 Id. at 5 (discussing the "chaos in broadcasting" resulting from this practice).
33 Id. at 25.
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would acquiesce and accept payment, making both parties better off.
The debate over how to best allocate these property rights has led to a
rich literature on liability versus property rules.
The liability-rule school of thought calls for ex post payment,
usually via a statutory license that ensures access to content for all
prospective licensees willing to pay the statutory rate. In their seminal
work on property rights, Professors Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed establish a preference for liability rules as the most efficient
means of collective valuation in intellectual property. 34 This collective
valuation, as determined by a court or legislative body, is embodied in
a statutory license3 5 and is intended to minimize transaction costs.
Indeed, compulsory licensing occurs in industries such as sound
recordings and cable broadcasting in which individual negotiation
with numerous, disparate rights holders would be both time and cost
prohibitive. Compulsory licensing in these industries allows for
efficient en masse licensing of content and subsequent scalability of
service where individual transactions are not practicable. 36 In their
work on bargaining and rights allocation, Professors Ian Ayres and
Eric Talley suggest that liability rules can encourage more efficient
contracting.37 They also posit that ambiguity can induce cooperation.38
The Clear Channel-Big Machine case study provides a real-world
example of this type of cooperation. 39
The property-rule school of thought requires ex ante negotiation,
often in the form of a blanket license issued by a CRO like the
American Society of Composers and Publishers (ASCAP) or
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). In his work on CROs, Professor Robert
Merges champions the position that property rules are more efficient
than liability rules for the licensing of intellectual property because
rights holders can and will contract those rights away when it is

34 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 27, at 1110 ("[T]he collective valuation
involved in liability rules readily lends itself to promoting distributional goals.").
35 In some industries, such as music publishing, a collective valuation may alternatively
be established by a CRO, such as the American Society of Composers and Publishers
(ASCAP).
36 Part II.B.1 questions whether the bulk licensing justification for compulsory licensing
is losing ground in the new digital age.
37 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033 (1995) ("[L]iability rules may induce
both more contracting and more efficient contracting than property rules.").
38 See id. at 1035 (using economic modeling to show "how ambiguity can induce
bargainers to act more cooperatively").
39 See infra Part II (detailing the benefits for both Clear Channel and Big Machine in
circumventing § 114 and the traditional deal structure).
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efficient to do so, thereby avoiding "transactional bottleneck[s]." 4 0 In
response to Calabresi and Melamed's case for liability rules, Merges
counters, inter alia, that a property rights regime is preferable insofar
as it is more likely to lead to the formation of CROs. 4 1 Merges
explains that in the absence of a compulsory licensing regime, an
industry can and will minimize costs 4 2 and increase efficiency by
setting up CROs to assign a collective valuation. 43 He thus
recommends a property rule approach for industries such as content
licensing where parties engage in repeat interaction.44
Interestingly, the establishment and administration of a collective
valuation by a CRO in an industry like digital music licensing-whose
inception came after the establishment of the statutory license, such
that there is not and never has been a real market for it-is effectively
a liability-rule regime, except that the rate is set by the relevant CRO
instead of by statute.
Despite popular acceptance of CROs as useful for concentrating
bargaining power and setting a collective valuation, 45 CROs fare no
better than statutory licenses at differentiating among individual
valuations. Merges recommends the establishment of CROs as a
means of "expert tailoring," 46 but while a CRO such as ASCAP
dedicated to the licensing of musical compositions may be able to
tailor a rate specific to that genre of content, its blanket licenses do
40 Merges, supra note 28, at 1295. In a recent article, Professor Mark Lemley questions
the import of this conclusion by pointing out that intellectual property rights owners can
and do contract around liability rules just as easily. Mark A. Lemley, ContractingAround
Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 464-65 (2012) ("True, parties can contract around
inefficient property rules in IP cases. But . . . they can-and do-contract around
inefficient liability rules as well."). The case for penalty default licenses, as presented in
this Article, provides proof of exactly that. In support of his argument, Lemley cites,
among other examples, the formation of SoundExchange, the CRO governing the
collection and administration of digital performance rights for sound recordings: "It was
the creation of a legal [digital performance] right, not the creation of a property rule to
enforce that right, that drove the founding of collective rights organizations to administer
public performance rights." Id. at 478.
41 Merges, supra note 28, at 1295.
42 See id. at 1302-03 ("It is the high transaction costs associated with the initial
entitlements that lead the parties to establish the [CRO]-an organization that then
dramatically lowers the costs of exchanging the rights.").
43 See id. at 1296 ("What separates private CROs from compulsory licensing schemes is
that the former have proven to be more flexible over time.").
44 See id. at 1297 ("[P]roperty rule entitlements may be superior in other situations
where right holders encounter each other frequently.").
45 See id. at 1294 (noting that CROs "promulgate rules and procedures for placing a
monetary value on members' property rights" and thereby "conserve on transaction costs
either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion
for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining").
46 See id. at 1295 (citing "expert tailoring" as one distinct advantage of CROs).
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nothing in the way of recognizing different values for the individual
pieces of music in its catalog. The tailoring performed by CROs is too
broad to be "expert" in any meaningful sense because it frequently
encompasses entire genres (e.g., sound recordings, musical
compositions, and films) without regard to specific pieces of content
contained within these genres. 47
As to whether CROs are efficient at setting "market rates," there
is insufficient data to make that determination. Until very recently
CROs like ASCAP prevented development of an actual market for
the licensing of musical compositions. 48 To the extent opt-out
indicates CRO failure, however, one need look no further than the
recent broadcaster deals, all of which explicitly circumvented Sound
Exchange. 49 And at the beginning of the year, the nation's largest
music publisher (Sony/ATV) announced that it would henceforth
handle all of its content licensing in private deals, on a case-by-case
basis, thereby withdrawing all of its content from ASCAP.50
Merges blames the popularity of the statutory license in
intellectual property on the high cost of transacting multiple deals
with multiple partners and argues that the same economy can be more
flexibly accomplished through CROs.51 Recent private content deals
cut against this argument, however. Like Merges, I believe that
statutory licenses lack the requisite flexibility to best serve intellectual
property licensing in the new digital age. Unlike Merges, however, I
believe CROs share that defect 5 2 and thus argue that the inflexibility
47 In the CROs' defense, it may be the case that tailoring is not worth it in the
collective. Future work will more fully examine the evolving role and questionable
efficiency of CROs.
48 Until the recent attempts at CRO circumvention, almost all music publishing
licensing was done through CROs so that there was no private market from which to cull a
market rate.
49 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
50 Sony/ATV's withdrawal paid off. On January 17, 2013, they signed a direct licensing
deal with Pandora for a digital performance rate twenty-five percent higher than ASCAP's
going rate. See, e.g., Sony/A TV Negotiates 25% Royalty Increase from Pandora: Report,
BILLBOARDBIZ (Jan. 17, 2013, 8:01 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
publishing/1510421/sonyatv-negotiates-25-royalty-increase-from-pandora-report
(describing Sony/ATV's negotiation with Pandora for a higher rate than earned under
ASCAP). This advantage appears to have ended, however. Shortly after Sony/ATV's
withdrawal, Pandora sued ASCAP to enforce its five-year blanket license, which included
(at the time of signing) all rights to the Sony/ATV repertoire. On September 17, 2013, the
court held for Pandora, denying content owners the right to parcel digital (or "new
media") from other rights. In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927,
at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
51 See Merges, supra note 28 (making the case for CROs in intellectual property).
52 A full discussion of CROs' legal and economic shortcomings and whether they might
be fixed (e.g., by the institution of mandatory participation) or ought to be scrapped
altogether will be addressed in future work. Until then, interested readers should see Ivan
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(and, by extension, uncertainty) of statutory licenses is precisely why
they should be kept-to encourage a truly flexible and efficient
valuation process through private ordering. This Article makes the
case that more, not less, compulsory licensing can actually increase
efficiency in intellectual property licensing, so long as it has been
converted into a penalty default license via uncertainty.53
While ultimately favoring a property-rule regime, this Article
departs from the received wisdom regarding the choice of rate-setting
entities. Unlike Merges's argument in favor of CROs as the optimal
means of establishing value in an intellectual property rights regime, 54
this Article argues that, while not perfect, private ordering offers a
more efficient, flexible, and responsive valuation option. As the
penalty default license approach involves a statutory license, it
necessarily invokes government action. Professors Peter DiCola and
Matthew Sag recognize the government as a third party in intellectual
property rights licensing: "We seek to augment the two-player
conception of [content licensing as between content owners and
technology companies] and to supplement the property-rights
framework with a detailed analysis of the government institutions that
create, monitor, and enforce property rights."55 Indeed, in the context
of the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal and its progeny, the
government's "threat" of a statutory terrestrial performance right has
encouraged private licensing and greater market efficiency.
Examples abound of uncertainty's influence on decisionmaking
behavior, and the idea has been widely acknowledged in other
literatures. 56 The idea that defaults can influence behavior for the
Reidel's work suggesting that the blanket licenses of performing rights organizations
(PROs), a specialized type of CRO in the music publishing industry, might not only be
inefficient, but even illegal from an antitrust perspective. See Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift
Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising and Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
731, 737 (2011) (declaring blanket licenses to be "illegal restraints of trade" and calling for
urgent reform of DOJ enforcement practices).
53 This Article focuses on penalty default licensing but recognizes that, to the extent
CROs share statutory licenses' tendency toward inflexibility and nonresponsiveness, they
too serve as an unpalatable fallback option and their proliferation could also function to
encourage more, and more efficient, private ordering (so long as they are not mandatory).
54 See Merges, supra note 28, at 1295 (citing "two distinct advantages of CROs: expert
tailoring and reduced political economy problems").
55 Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright
Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REv. 173, 176 (2012).
56 See, e.g., supra note 16 (recognizing the behavior-influencing properties of
uncertainty). In the enforcement context, for example, uncertainty has been associated
with higher compliance rates. Of course, an optimally efficient solution would be a one
hundred percent enforcement rate and imposition of an appropriate fine. But society
settles for less than one hundred percent enforcement-in the context of speeding, for
example-because enforcement is costly. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
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better is also well established in the legal literature. Professors Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler popularized this principle in their
influential work on libertarian paternalism, suggesting that "[w]hat
[people] choose is strongly influenced by details of the context in
which they make their choice, for example default rules . . . ."5' The
Clear Channel-Big Machine deal and its progeny extend this analysis
by showing that uncertainty, when coupled with a penalty default, can
not only influence behavior but also improve efficiency in the
marketplace.
Unlike libertarian paternalism, which assumes that people will
stick to the default and consequently focuses on choosing the best
default, penalty default licenses assume that uncertainty can
encourage circumvention. This view focuses on selecting an
unpalatable default. Both approaches aim to produce a welfaremaximizing result. Penalty default licenses recognize that uncertainty
has the same efficiency-promoting effect on market behavior as it
does on individual behavior. Just as risk-averse individuals can be
motivated to make better decisions when faced with an unpalatable
alternative, so too can contracting entities be encouraged to negotiate
more efficient deal terms to avoid an unpalatable default. In the
statutory licensing context, uncertainty converts the statutory license
into a penalty default license. The default nature of the license helps
to encourage risk-averse players to engage in private ordering. This is
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332-33, 349-59
(1989) (discussing the enforcement costs in the copyright context).
Uncertainty's effect on choice is also seen in the collective action context. For
example, on January 13, 1950, the Soviet Union announced its boycott of the U.N. Security
Council in response to the defeat of a Soviet proposal to expel the Nationalist Chinese
representative. This resulted in the absence of a Soviet delegate from the first ever U.N.
vote on military action. At that meeting, the Security Council voted to send troops to
South Korea in retaliation for the North Korean attack there. See Jan 13, 1950: Soviets
Boycott United Nations Security Council, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/soviets-boycott-united-nations-security-council (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). Had they
attended, the Soviets could have blocked the action with their absolute veto, but they
missed the opportunity, teaching the world a valuable lesson: It is better to join the group
than to suffer the uncertainties of being bound by collective action anyway, only without
any say. There is also the concern of appearing disagreeable to the collective agenda,
especially where group practices might eventually become industry norms (or, in the Soviet
example, accepted as customary international law).
57 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003); see also Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2044 (2012) (advocating a kind of
libertarian paternalism that uses altering rules-i.e. rules that establish the necessary and
sufficient conditions for displacing a default-"to encourage contracting parties to choose
the default or nondefault options that they jointly prefer"). This Article argues for the use
of penalty default rules to encourage the parties to choose a mutually agreeable nondefault
option.
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wholly consistent with prospect theory, which holds that people make
decisions based on valuations of the potential losses and gains.58
The application of behavioral economics to law, and especially to
the market for intellectual property, has occasionally been criticized
as contrived and overly hypothetical: "A significant concern for the
behavioral law and economics policy agenda is that biases
documented in experimental settings may not prove robust when
exposed to market institutions." 59 Unlike the "laboratory" findings
lamented by Professor Joshua Wright and Judge Douglas Ginsburg,
however, the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal and its successors offer
a real-world, practical application of behavioral economics in the
marketplace and in copyright law in particular. Section 114 and the
recent broadcast deals demonstrate the efficiency-enhancing value of
bounded uncertainty in the market. Not only does this uncertainty
work to overcome the tendency of defaults toward stickiness, it also
mitigates concerns about inequality and gamesmanship by serving as
an unpalatable fallback for both licensees and licensors.
In the case of § 114, the impetus for private action comes from
uncertainty about the future state of the law and future digital
business models. This uncertainty is "bounded" in the sense that while
neither licensees nor licensors know exactly when a statutory
terrestrial performance right will be granted (or what its eventual
royalty rate will be), there are a few known parameters that
differentiate it from unbounded uncertainty. For example, the parties
know that the statutory terrestrial performance right will most likely

58 The seminal paper discussing this phenomenon is Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979).
59 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implicationsfor Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2012)
("Indeed ... many .. . of the behaviorists' findings are fragile and disappear when exposed
to market discipline . . . ."). Professor Wright and Judge Ginsburg reference, among others
and by way of example, the experiment conducted by Professors Christopher Buccafusco
and Christopher Sprigman (who, it should be mentioned, make no claim of its application
to the marketplace). Id. at 1042 n.34. In their experiment, Buccafusco and Sprigman tested
the existence of the endowment effect in intellectual property. Using mostly undergraduate
students at the University of Virginia, the professors paid them for half an hour of study at
a computer lab in which the subjects wrote haikus and were asked to select among options
with varying levels of monetary value and ownership. See Christopher Buccafusco &
Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 17-25 (2010) (describing their experiment). Specifically, Wright and Ginsburg allege that
"profit motive, which create[s] incentives for participants to specialize and to learn to
reduce their errors," is "not present in the laboratory." Wright & Ginsburg, supra,
1044-45. Profit motive is, however, present in the Clear Channel-Big Machine case study
presented in Part II.C.
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come to exist 60 and that, when it does, it will most likely be established
in the form of a statutory license (i.e., a fallback option) that will be
collected and administered by a CRO. 6 1 They may not know how long
it will take digital services to surpass terrestrial services as the radio
format of choice, but they know that this will happen eventually. 62
The next Part describes the history and general terms of the Clear
Channel-Big Machine deal to demonstrate the efficiency-enhancing
benefits of private ordering induced by bounded uncertainty.
II
THE PRESENT: CIRCUMVENTING INEFFICIENCY

By virtue of its inherent flexibility and personalization, private
ordering improves on the inefficiencies of the statutory license in
several ways. First, it allows for a negotiated rate tailored specifically
to the content and use in question, which may better align incentives
between the parties. In addition, a privately negotiated deal can be
repeatedly amended in response to technological developments and
changing consumer preferences in real time. This allows for greater
experimentation in business models, potentially bringing better
services to market. Finally, private deal making takes market
valuations into account, resulting in more accurate pricing for
consumers and better alignment of licensors' incentive to create with
licensees' incentive to invest.
Yet if private ordering is more efficient than statutory licensing,
why was the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal the first one to
circumvent § 114? Why might a party stick with an inefficient default?
The exploration of these questions begins with a brief look at the
history of terrestrial performance rights and an examination of how
statutory licensing works.
A.

Terrestrial Performance Rights and Statutory Licensing

Before turning to the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, a brief
overview of the controversy surrounding terrestrial performance
rights is necessary to appreciate its import. Music is protected by two
60 Infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
61 See Chris Castle, Guest Post: Meet the Free Market Royalty Act, an Elegant Solution
to Some

Complex Issues,

BILLBOARDBIZ

(Oct.

1,

2013,

12:43

PM),

http://

www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5740706/guest-post-meet-thefree-market-royalty-act-an (discussing the Act as "a logical step in SoundExchange's
evolution to authorize it to issue blanket licenses, continue to collect and pay royalties and
to audit licensees").
62 See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (noting the decline of terrestrial radio
and the rapid growth of digital radio).
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distinct copyrights: one on the underlying musical composition 63 (the
"mechanical" right) and one on the aural representation of that
composition 64 (the "master" right). The latter covers sound
recordings-popularly termed "songs" or "tracks"-and is governed
by the statutory license in § 114. Generally, recording artists and
songwriters assign their copyrights to intermediary record labels and
music publishers, respectively, who then license and collect royalties
on those works.
An exclusive right of public performance derives from these
mechanical and master rights. 65 It entitles copyright holders to
statutory royalties when their sound recordings or compositions are
played publicly. 66 For compositions, the performance right attaches
both digitally (e.g., Internet radio) and terrestrially (e.g., traditional
broadcast radio). For sound recordings, however, the performance
right only attaches digitally (not terrestrially). A spin of Taylor Swift's
We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together67 on a local broadcast
radio station, therefore, would require that a performance royalty be
paid to the owner(s) of the mechanical copyright (songwriters Taylor
Swift, Max Martin, and Shellback, in accordance with their respective
publishing deals, and Sony/ATV) 68 but not to the owner(s) of the
sound recording (Taylor Swift and Big Machine). A spin of the same
track on an Internet radio station like Pandora, however, would
require that performance royalties be paid to both copyright
holders. 69
If all of this strikes the reader as unduly complicated, the reader
is in good company. Proponents on both sides of the issue agree on
only one thing: The system stinks. Inequality between digital and
terrestrial performance royalties for sound recordings has long been a
point of contention. Broadcasters have traditionally resisted a
performance right for sound recordings on the basis that radio
programming provides a valuable promotional service to artists and
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (affording the copyright owner the exclusive right, "in
the case of ... musical .. . works,... to perform the copyrighted work publicly"); § 106(6)
(affording the copyright owner the exclusive right, "in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission").
66 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(2), 115 (2012).
67 TAYLOR Swwr, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together, on RED (Big Machine
Records 2012).
63
64
65

68 Id.

69 Note that a spin of the same track on a preexisting satellite radio station like
SiriusXM would also require royalties be paid to both, but at a significantly lower rate for
the sound recording (whereas the composition rate would remain the same). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(d)(2) (setting forth differential treatment for preexisting services).
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record labels, and, as such, they should not have to pay for plays. 70
Music publishers and songwriters, worried that a performance right
for sound recordings would cut into their performance royalties for
compositions, sided with broadcasters to successfully block a
performance right for sound recordings from the Copyright Act of
1976.71 It was nearly twenty years later before a performance right for
sound recordings was finally instituted, and even then only for digital
(not terrestrial) broadcast. 72
The debate over terrestrial performance rights does not appear to
have lost any steam. In a March 2013 speech at Columbia University,
Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante called for "a more complete
right of public performance for sound recordings."73 Meanwhile, NAB
insists that "NAB and broadcasters have been, and continue to be,
unalterably opposed to the Performance Rights Act since it was first
introduced in 2007."74 In the midst of this ongoing debate,
Representative Mel Watt introduced the latest iteration of a terrestrial
performance rights act (the unfortunately titled "Free Market Royalty
Act"7 5 ) on September 30, 2013. As discussed further in Part III.A,
70 For an example of a payola story, see New Settlement in Payola Probe, ABC NEWS
(May 11, 2006, 1:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2006/05/new_settlement_/,
which quotes then-New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as finding that "UMG
has illegally provided radio stations with financial benefits to obtain airplay and boost the
chart position of its songs." Interestingly, empirical analysis does not support the
entrenched notion that airtime is something worth paying for. Recent statistical analysis
finds no determinative evidence that radio play boosts record sales. See, e.g., Stan J.
Liebowitz, The Elusive Symbiosis: The Impact of Radio on the Record Industry, 1 REv.
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 93, 118 (2004) ("The evidence from this empirical
examination indicates that, contrary to common beliefs, radio broadcast does not enhance
the market for sound recordings."). Furthermore, the broadcasters' position is notably
weakened by the payment of performance royalties by digital radio stations, which provide
similar promotional value. In fact, a convincing argument might be made that digital
radio-with its ability to track listener behavior-has the potential to bring even more
such value in the form of user metrics.
71 See, e.g., John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global
Harmonization-Andthe Need for Congress to Get in Step with a Full PublicPerformance
Right for Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1053
(2002) ("Joining the NAB's position against a full public performance right for sound
recordings are songwriters, music publishers, and performing rights societies. They claim it
is the songwriter and music publisher who will lose a substantial portion of income.").
72 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified as amended in sections of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114).
73 Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights of the U.S. & Dir. of the U.S. Copyright
Office, The Next Great Copyright Act, Twenty-Sixth Horace S. Manges Lecture at
Columbia Law School (Mar. 4, 2013), in 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 324 (2013).
74 NAT'L Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS AcT PuTs LOCAL
JOBS AT RISK (2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.nab.org/documents/
advocacy/performanceTax/PerformanceTaxlssueSheet0911.pdf.
75 H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013); see also 159 CONG. REc. E1404-05 (daily ed. Sept.

30, 2013) (statement of Rep. Watt) [hereinafter Rep. Watt's Statement] (calling the Free
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never before has the threat of a statutory terrestrial performance
royalty been so imminent. When deemed credible, "the threat of
legislation in and of itself, rather than legislation, plays a remarkable
role in controlling behavior, in setting underlying incentives, in
maintaining social order, and in inducing change and effecting social
policy." 76 The effect of such legislative uncertainty can be seen at play
in the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, along with the inefficiencies
of statutory licensing.
Statutory, or compulsory, licenses77 constitute open offers that
allow for the use of certain types of copyright-protected content
without requiring permission from, or agreement with, the rights
holder.78 In most cases, a statutory rate and standard terms of use are
set and available to all licensees willing and able to comply. This
system ensures access to content for all comers regardless of size,
market share, or bargaining power. It reduces the potential for
anticompetitive behavior by both licensors, who would otherwise be
able to demand exorbitant rates or withhold content from
competitors, and licensees, who might otherwise outbid smaller
players in such a way as to cut them out of the market altogether. In
the absence of a statutory licensing regime, smaller, less powerful
licensees could be denied access to a licensor's intellectual property.
Accordingly, this Article does not advocate for elimination of the
statutory license, despite its inefficiencies. Indeed, as will be shown,
inefficiencies can provide the impetus for parties to engage in private
ordering. The rest of this Part considers the inefficiencies that
motivated the parties in the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal to
circumvent § 114.
B. Taylor Swift: A Case Study
In June 2012, media conglomerate and content licensee Clear
Channel entered into a private licensing deal with independent record
Market Royalty Act "an agreement that would end the years of waiting for fair pay for
airplay").
76 Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629, 635 (2008).
77 Although the terms "statutory" and "compulsory" are often used interchangeably to
refer to the various statutory licenses governing the licensing of intellectual property, there
is a linguistic distinction worth mentioning. In general use, compulsory is understood as a
synonym for "mandatory." 17 U.S.C. § 111, the statutory license for broadcast cable, is an
example of a compulsory license in the mandatory sense of the word-all licensees and
licensors are obligated to operate under it. Section 114, in contrast, is compulsory only
insofar as a licensor cannot refuse to license to any prospective licensee willing and able to
pay the statutory rate. Parties are not required to operate under § 114, however, and
instead may opt to circumvent the license altogether in favor of private ordering.
78 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (broadcast cable); id. § 114 (sound recordings); id.
§ 115 (musical compositions); id. § 119 (satellite television).
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label and content licensor Big Machine, granting it the hotly contested
terrestrial performance right. It did so by circumventing § 114,
another unprecedented move. Under the terms of the deal, both
digital and terrestrial performance royalties are paid directly from
Clear Channel to Big Machine, thereby circumventing
SoundExchange's role as a CRO. 79 This arrangement saves the parties
money on two fronts: (1) SoundExchange's administrative fee, and (2)
the direct-to-artist payment requirement under § 114(g)(2). 80
The Clear Channel-Big Machine deal makes for an interesting
case study not only because it establishes an obligation to pay that
seems to run contrary to the parties' respective bargaining positions,
but because it departs from the traditional broadcaster position on
terrestrial performance rights. As CBS President and CEO Les
Moonves commented to the press shortly after the announcement of
the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal: "The idea that we have to pay
[record labels] to put their music on our radio stations is absurd." 8
This statement echoes the NAB's response to the announcement of
the deal: "NAB remains steadfastly opposed to a governmentmandated performance tax on local radio stations . . . ."82
In exchange for this unprecedented creation of a terrestrial
performance royalty for sound recordings, the parties agreed on a
lower digital performance royalty than provided for in the statutory
license. Both royalties replace the statutory license's fixed, per-play
rate with a rate set as a share of advertising revenues. While the terms
of the deal lower Big Machine's share of the pie by reducing the
digital performance royalty vis-A-vis the statutory rate, they also
substantially enlarge the size of the pie by giving Big Machine access
to all of Clear Channel's terrestrial advertising revenues. 83
79 See, e.g., Christman, supra note 8 ("[S]ince the deal is a negotiated rate, payments
will bypass SoundExchange and be made directly to the label . . . .").
80 Section 114(g)(2) lays out a distribution scheme for royalties collected under the
statute. This scheme includes payment of a portion of royalties directly to artists, which can
be avoided by circumventing the statute altogether. See infra Part II.B.2.a (outlining how
private ordering improves upon the statutory license).
81 Ben Sisario, Taylor Swift's Record Label Continues Its Online-Offline Royalties
Experiment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/20/taylor-swifts-record-label-continues-its-online-offline-royalties-experiment/;
accord AM. TELEVISION ALLIANCE, FOR BROADCASTERS, FLIP-FLOPS NEVER Go OUT OF
SEASON (2013), available at http://www.americantelevisionalliance.orglwp-content/uploads/
2013/05/ATVAFactSheetFlipFlopv9.pdf.
82 Ed Christman, NAB, Recording Academy Weigh In on Clear Channel-Big Machine
Royalty Deal, BILLBOARDBIZ (June 5, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/1094626/nab-recording-academy-weigh-in-on-clear-channel-big-machineroyalty-deal.
83 See Luiz Buff & Nicholas Spanos, Clear Channel's Giant Step, Music Bus. J., July
2012, at 6, available at http://www.thembj.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MBJ-July-
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Clear Channel is a large company employing more than 20,000
people 84 and reporting $1.63 billion in revenue for the quarter ending
June 30, 2014.85 Big Machine, in contrast, is a small, independent
record label. As of this writing, the label had all of six recording artists
on its roster. 86 The fact that the market-dominant Clear Channel has
agreed to pay Big Machine-a relative little guy-for content use that
does not trigger a legal payment obligation suggests that the concern
over the imbalance of power between licensees and licensors is
overblown. Since the signing of the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal
in June 2012, a series of similar agreements between these and other
licensees and licensors has been completed.87
Why are these deals taking place notwithstanding significant
differences in bargaining power? Several selfish motivations have
been suggested-the opportunity to set a market rate, the
disadvantage to competitors, the intent to signal a threat to larger
partners-but they are only part of the story. As discussed in the next
Part, uncertainty about the future state of terrestrial performance
rights and future digital business models is unfavorable for both
licensee and licensor, thereby leveling the playing field in a way that
has heretofore gone unrecognized. Unlike the statutory license, the
Clear Channel-Big Machine deal offers a stable, predictable outcome
tailored to the covered content and its contemplated use.
The Clear Channel-Big Machine deal can thus be framed as both
a business deal motivated by efficiency concerns and a shrewd
preemptive move prompted by anticompetitive motivations. Both
explanations are correct and both hinge upon uncertainty about the
future legal status of terrestrial-performance rights and future digital
business models.
First, the efficiency explanation: Spurred by an inefficient
statutory license, Clear Channel and Big Machine circumvented § 114
and created a new, private intellectual property right-the terrestrial
performance right-that better serves their needs and the demands of
their consumers in the new, digital environment. Dozens of copycat
deals have followed, bringing predictability and cooperation to a
historically unstable and contentious industry while correcting many
2012-Final.pdf (describing the deal as a "free market solution" that may ultimately set a
"new standard for royalty payments on broadcast radio").
84 Investor FAQ, CLEARCHANNEL, http://www.clearchannel.com/Investors/Pages/FAQ.
aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
85 Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 23, 2014).
86 See Big Machine Records, BIG MACHINE LABEL GROUP, http://www.bigmachine
labelgroup.com/label/bigmachine-records (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
87 See supra note 10 (citing sources discussing three such deals).
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of the inefficiencies of the extant, one-size-fits-all statutory regime.
These parties are thus making their own efficiency through private
ordering.
Next, the self-interested explanation: Though the statutory
terrestrial performance right does not currently exist, it very likely will
soon,88 and the eventual statutory rate and terms are uncertain. By
being "first to market" with a valuation, Clear Channel stands to have
its private rate adopted industry-wide-both informally, via industry
norms stemming from repetition of the rate in subsequent deals, and
formally, via mandatory adoption by the Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB) 89 in the absence of an alternate rate. 90 This would not only
ensure an acceptable rate for Clear Channel but could impose
hardship on competitors who value their digital businesses differently.
The same might be said of Big Machine, who could secure preferential
treatment for its artists at the expense of its competitors.91
Moreover, terrestrial radio is on the decline, while digital radio is
on the rise. 92 It thus makes more sense for Clear Channel to give on
the former, in return for better terms on the latter. It is especially
interesting that Clear Channel completed its first such deal with Big
Machine, 93 given the label's status as an independent record label
distributed through a major label. 94 Clear Channel was almost
See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
The CRB holds hearings every five years to set the statutory royalty rates under
§§ 114 and 115 for the subsequent five-year period. 17 U.S.C. § 804(b)(1) (2012) ("Any
change in royalty rates made under this chapter . .. may be reconsidered in the year 2015,
and each fifth calendar year thereafter .... ).
90 In the case of sound recordings, a value presented to the CRB as representative of
the market rate is adopted if, after publication in the Federal Register with a call for
comments, there are no effective objections. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (2012) (outlining the
authority and qualifications of Copyright Royalty Judges). In a 2009 rate-setting
proceeding concerning digital phonorecord delivery, for example, the rate court said,
"[W]e have no choice but to adopt [the private valuation] as the basis for the necessary
statutory rates and terms applicable to the corresponding licensed activities.... The statute
[17 U.S.C. H§ 801-803] provides that the settlement is an adjustment of rates and terms by
the parties that we must adopt." Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate
Determination Proceeding, 74 Fed. Reg. 4510, 4515 (Jan. 26, 2009).
91 For example, Big Machine might be able to secure one of Clear Channel's billboard
properties to promote a new Taylor Swift album, or may be able to lock her into the
headlining position on Clear Channel's iHeart Radio Music Festival, thereby denying these
opportunities to other artists.
92 Digital advertising revenues are projected to increase by more than double digits
between 2014 and 2021, while Internet-only radio is expected to nearly quadruple. See SNL
KAGAN, ECONOMICS OF INTERNET MUSIC AND RADIO 8, 13 (2011).
93 Clear Channel has subsequently completed comparable deals with Glassnote,
DashGo, rpm Entertainment, Robbins Entertainment, Naxos, and Entertainment One
Music, among others. See supra note 10.
94 Big Machine is currently distributed by Universal Music Group Distribution, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Music Group, one of the three remaining major
88

89
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certainly aware that word of this deal would get back to the major
labels, perhaps serving as a not-so-subtle threat to sign on or be left
behind. 95
Under both explanations-efficiency and self-interest-the
parties' motivation to circumvent § 114 stems from the statutory
license's inefficiencies and the potential to achieve better results
through private agreement.
1. Statutory Inefficiency

Section 114 is unnecessarily complicated and inefficient. It is
inefficient because parties who circumvent the statutory license and
negotiate private terms fare better than they would under the license.
And when this circumvention takes place under a penalty default
license, such as § 114, they fare better without making parties who
continue to operate under the statutory license worse off. 9 6
As a statutory license for copyright-protected content, § 114 sets
a statutory rate for a specified time period, after which the rate is
subject to change. 97 The CRB is tasked with determining and
adjusting "reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments." 98 The
statutory rate for digital performance royalties for sound recordings
labels in the United States. See Overview, UNIVERSAL Music GROUP, http://
www.universalmusic.com/company (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (referencing Big Machine's
distribution deal).
95 This approach-testing the waters with a smaller, unthreatening partner before
attempting a deal with larger, more powerful partners-is also strategic. It is interesting for
its divergence from the traditional music licensing deal wherein digital music services
approach major labels directly first, allowing smaller labels to fall into line once those
terms have been set. The music services appear to have realized that they have more to
gain in negotiations with a less entrenched and powerful partner. And the strategy worked:
On September 12, 2013, a little more than a year after the Clear Channel-Big Machine
deal, Clear Channel and Warner Music Group, one of the three remaining major label
groups, announced a similar deal creating a terrestrial performance right. See Sisario,supra
note 10 (describing the deal between Clear Channel and Warner Music Group). This
bandwagon effect raises yet another concern: As more and more players opt into private
deals, the value of those deals is diminished. What about the Big Machine artists who have
given up their direct royalty payments in anticipation of getting special promotional
treatment from Clear Channel, only to now find that the full roster of Warner artists has
joined the fray? And now that the full Warner roster is on board, how valuable is it for
another label to join up? How many artists can Clear Channel offer promotional value to
before the privilege loses its value?
96 As detailed in Part III.B.1-2, the continuing existence of the statutory license,
however inherently inefficient, serves as an access point for those parties unable or
unwilling to command a private deal in the marketplace.
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)-(C) (2012) (describing criteria to be used by the
Copyright Royalty Judges to establish rates).
98 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012).
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adjusts annually and is set in five-year blocks by the CRB. 99 While
originally intended to allow for responsiveness to ongoing
technological change, a royalty rate scheduled to change annually has
done nothing to lend stability or predictability to an industry already
in turmoil.
If a fluctuating statutory rate were not enough to put parties
operating under § 114 on edge, the CRB also applies different ratesetting standards to different types of content delivery services. The
rate for services existing at the inception of the statutory licenseaptly named "pre-existing services"-is set under § 801(b)(1) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the 801(b) standard).100 For all services
originating after the inception of the statutory license, the rate is set
under a standard intended (ironically) to emulate fair market value by
looking at what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in a
hypothetical marketplace (the "willing buyer, willing seller"
standard).101 Under this standard, Internet radio providers like
Pandora currently pay more than fifty percent of their revenues in
digital performance royalties. 102 The irony lies in the fact that there is
not, and never has been, a "market" for digital radio because that
business model has operated under the statutory license since its
inception. The § 801(b) standard, on the other hand, currently yields
royalty rates approaching eight percent of revenues for satellite and
99 See 17 U.S.C.

§ 804(b)(1)

(2012) (outlining the process by which royalty rates

change).
100 The § 801(b) standard considers four factors when setting a rate: (1) maximization of
availability of creative works to the public; (2) fair return to the copyright owner and fair
income to the copyright user; (3) relative and technological contribution, capital
investment, cost and risk; and (4) minimization of disruptive impact on the industries

involved. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).
101 Section 114(f)(2)(B) defines the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard as follows:
In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall base
their decision on economic, competitive and programming information
presented by the parties, including-(i) whether use of the service may
substitute for or may promote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise may
interfere with or may enhance the sound recording copyright owner's other
streams of revenue from its sound recordings; and (ii) the relative roles of the
copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the
service made available to the public with respect to relative creative
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk. In
establishing such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider
the rates and terms for comparable types of digital audio transmission services
and comparable circumstances under voluntary license agreements ....
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B).
102 See, e.g., Eric Savitz, Musicians Oppose Bill to Cut Royalties Paid by Pandora,
FORBES (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/11/14/
musicians-oppose-bill-to-cut-royalties-paid-by-pandora ("In 2011, Pandora paid over 50%
of [its] revenues in performance royalties . . . .").
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cable audio providers like SiriusXM and Music Choice, roughly onesixth of the rate under the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard.10 3
This six-fold disparity between rates increases the overall inefficiency
of § 114, not least of all for its propensity to lead to legislation and
litigation. 104
As with other statutory licenses for copyright-protected content,
§ 114 also lacks the ability to differentiate between market valuations
on a per-user, or a per-product, basis. 105 Instead, it sets a rate
103See, e.g., David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Oral Argument on SiriusXM
SoundExchange Royalties-A View of the Application of the 801(b) StandardProposedfor
Internet Radio, BROAD. L. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2012/
10/articles/copyright-royalty-board-oral-argument-on-sirius-xm-soundexchange-royaltiesa-view-of-the-application-of-the-801b-standard-proposed-for-internet-radio/ (discussing
the debate between SiriusXM and SoundExchange over whether the rate should increase
or decrease from "the 8% of revenue that the service now pays").
104 The marked inequality in rate-setting standards under § 114 has led to the drafting
and introduction of several pieces of legislation, most recently the Internet Radio Fairness
Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012), and, in response, the Interim Fairness in Radio
Starts Today Act of 2012. For a discussion draft of the Interim Act, see H.R. , 112th
Cong. (2012), available at http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/files/documents/
NADLER_153_xml.pdf. In the midst of these legislative proposals, SiriusXM has filed a
lawsuit alleging that interference from SoundExchange has prevented it from engaging in
direct negotiation with the major record labels. Complaint, Sirius XM Radio Inc. v.
SoundExchange, Inc., No. 12-CV-2259 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012). In a suit recently filed in
New York federal court, Pandora has sued ASCAP for setting mechanical royalty rates
that are alleged to be "ill-suited and not reasonable." Petition of Pandora Media, Inc. for
the Determination of Reasonable License Fees at 3, In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ.
8035 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2012). Pandora followed that suit with another challenging the right
of ASCAP members to withdraw "New Media" rights from ASCAP's blanket license. In re
Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927, at *13-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2013) (granting Pandora's motion for summary judgment concerning ASCAP publisher
withdrawals of New Media licensing rights).
105 The use of product differentiation is prevalent among licensees in the streaming
music space, who frequently offer two or more tiers of service: There is an introductory
"freemium" tier that is, as the name suggests, free (usually ad supported) and generally
constrained by certain limitations on capacity and functionality. There is also a "premium"
offering with increased capacity (e.g., unlimited streaming) and functionality (e.g., offline
listening). See, e.g., UPGRADE, SporHFy, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium (last visited
Sept. 9, 2014) (describing free and premium tiers). This is classic product differentiationlicensees are charging different prices based on differences in quality. A licensor may well
be willing to charge less for content used under a freemium tier (to help encourage new
subscribers to check out a licensee's service) in exchange for collecting a higher fee for
content used under a premium tier (i.e., upon conversion of those new subscribers to the
upgraded tier). Licensees and licensors thus work cooperatively to build their respective
businesses, while sharing both the risk and the reward. Section 114 applies only to
noninteractive streaming-also known as "passive listening," in that the user is unable to
request a particular song and can only request a particular genre or tracks that sound like a
particular song or artist-which leaves all interactive licensing to the private sector. See 17
U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) (exempting interactive services from the statutory license). There,
services routinely charge different rates for different content and types of use. See, e.g.,
Sponrvy, supra. One problem presented by this practice in the interactive sector-but
avoidable on the noninteractive side due to the presence of a statutory license that acts as a
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regardless of the product, the licensee, or the use. 106 By design, a
conventional statutory license provides a one-size-fits-all rate that is
differentiated, when at all, by licensee type,1 07 but not by the content's
market value (product differentiation) or the type of use (price
differentiation). Price differentiation (sometimes referred to as "price
discrimination") allows licensors to charge different prices to different
licensees for the same product.108 Product differentiation, on the other
hand, allows a licensor to charge different prices for different
products.109 The lack of price and product differentiation under a
statutory license can result in artificial pricing that neither reflects nor
responds to the market or consumer preferences. This effect may
result in misallocation, where some consumers would be willing to pay
more, or could negotiate to pay less, for a particular piece or use of
content. It may also reduce incentives for the creation and production
of content that satisfies consumer demand.
In addition to inhibiting the ability to differentiate according to
the content's market value, a statutory rate-even one that
distinguishes between different licensee service types-is unable to
default-is the so-called "pump and dump." Given the unpredictable nature of the digital
music space and the deterioration of traditional record label revenues, most content
licensors in the space require very large advances up front. See, e.g., Michael Arrington,
Confirmed: MySpace to Launch New Music Joint Venture with Big Labels, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 2, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/04/02/myspace-to-launch-new-music-jointventure-with-big-labels/ (describing the distribution of monies to equity-holding copyright
owners). Scores of fledgling digital music ventures have allegedly folded as a result of this
practice, prompting a backlash against major label licensing as coercive. See, e.g., Paul
Resnikoff, Robertson: Major Label Licensing Will Kill Your Startup. . ., DIGITAL MUSIC
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20120502090744/http://digitalmusicnews.
com/stories/091211robertson (calling the odds of making money on a major label deal
"pretty close to zero"); Paul Resnikoff, So Turntable.frn Just Got Its Label Licenses. R.I.P.
Turntable.frn?, DIGITAL Music NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://web.archive.org/web/201203
15165730/http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/120312turntable (discussing
digital start-up Turntable.fm's struggle with indifferent and disinterested content licensors).
106 Nor is differentiation accomplished by the blanket licenses of CROs. See supra Part I
(explaining how CROs do no better at recognizing market valuations). For an interesting
read on how failure to allow for value differentiation from one song to another leads to
higher-than-desired advertising levels, see Reidel, supra note 52.
107 In setting the statutory royalty rate for digital performance of sound recordings, for
instance, § 114 differentiates between interactive and noninteractive services. 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(d)(2)(A)(i). To determine the applicable rate-setting standard, to take another
example, it differentiates between services that predate and those that postdate the
statutory license. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(B).
108 See, e.g., Louis PHLIPS, THE EcoNoMIcs

OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION

5 (1983)

("There is price discrimination when the same commodity is sold at different prices to
different consumers.").
109 KENNETH D. GEORGE, CAROLINE JOLL & E.L. LYNK, INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION:
COMPETITION, GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

214 (Routledge 4th ed. 1992) (1971)

("[In a market characterised by product differentiation[,] the firms ... choose the number
and quality of products to produce . . . as well as determine prices.").
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accommodate new technologies and business models in a timely
fashion. As a result, § 114 is unable to respond to rapid technological
change and the new business models such change brings. The CRB
rate-setting procedure, for example, is governed by 17 U.S.C.
§ 804(b), which outlines a specific and extensive notice-and-comment
period. 110 For this reason, the rate-setting process is statutorily
scheduled to begin a full two years prior to the expiration of the
current rate schedule.1"' This timeframe makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the statutory rate to respond to market changes
efficiently.
Fluctuating rates, varying rate-setting standards, inflexibility, and
lack of differentiation discourage new entrants, potentially lowering
competition and increasing costs while simultaneously decreasing the
quality and quantity of offerings (as well as access to content). These
inefficiencies negatively impact not only the parties operating under
the statutory license but also overall welfare. Statutory licensing rates
in the music industry have long been a focal point of lobbying efforts
by the recording and broadcasting industries, 112 and the Free Market
Royalty Act has been no exception."i 3 There has also been no
shortage of litigation with satellite radio service SiriusXM suing
SoundExchangell 4 and Internet radio provider Pandora suing
ASCAP.1i 5 As both legislation and litigation are, to a large extent,
publicly subsidized-in that U.S. federal and state court systems, as
well as congressional salaries, are funded with taxpayer dollars-a
regime that encourages these activities decreases overall social
welfare.116
110 See 17 U.S.C. § 804(b) (2012) (outlining in detail how royalty rates are adjusted).
111 See id. (describing the timing of rate-setting proceedings as two years out).
112 See generally Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin,
as Soon as We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with
Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2001) (describing the long and continuing story
of lobbying around statutory licensing rates in the music industry).
113 See, e.g., Clients Lobbying on H.R. 3219: Free Market Royalty Act, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id-hr3219-113 (listing origanizations that
have registered to lobby on the Free Market Royalty Act).
114 See SiriusXM Radio Inc. v. SoundExchange, Inc., No. 12-CV-2259 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2012) (alleging that interference from SoundExchange has prevented SiriusXM from
negotiating directly with the major record labels).
115 See Petition of Pandora Media, Inc. for the Determination of Reasonable License
Fees, supra note 104, at 3 (alleging the setting of "ill-suited and not reasonable"
mechanical royalty rates).
116 This Article takes a position in favor of a terrestrial performance right insofar as it
comports with copyright's goal of incentivizing creation. A different but reasonable
position might suggest elimination of the digital performance right as an alternative means
of eliminating the disparity.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 2014]1

PENALTY DEFAULT LICENSES

1145

The bureaucratic nature of statutory amendment denies § 114 the
requisite flexibility to quickly bring these new services to market in
real time, thereby delaying (and in some cases denying) consumers the
benefit of new and potentially preferable means of accessing the
licensed content.117 In the span of time required for a rate adjustment
proceeding to be noticed, held, ruled upon, and enacted, a new
technology can come and go (or come and stay) and-due to the
nonexistence of a statutory rate for that particular type of new
service-establish an industry norm that is not easy to change and
may not comply with legislative goals." 8
Finally, the per-play structure of the statutory rate misaligns
incentives between licensees and licensors, who are put at odds over
how much content to use: more, from the content owners' perspective
since they earn royalties on a per-use basis, or less, from the
perspective of broadcasters and other services that pay for each use of
that content. Without cooperation between parties whose businesses
are interdependent, both businesses and consumers lose out on
potential synergies.
2.

Private Efficiency

Meanwhile, private ordering improves upon the unpalatability of
the statutory license in several ways: (1) by improving cooperation
between otherwise divergent parties, (2) by establishing a more
predictable and stable royalty rate, (3) by allowing for rapid
accommodation of new technology and business models, and (4) by
differentiating among valuations for different content and uses. Using
the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal as a case study, this section
identifies the efficiency gains resulting from the circumvention of
§ 114. It also challenges the legitimacy of these gains to the extent
they are neither enjoyed by nonparties nor shared by society overall.
117 See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Wither Convergence: Legal, Regulatory, and Trade
Opportunism in Telecommunications, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

171, 179 (2002) ("'[R]egulatory lag' [is] becom[ing] a more common occurrence. A
significant period of time may run before regulations reflect changes in technological and
marketplace circumstances. During such periods of delayed adjustment, the regulatory
process may favor one competitor over others."). Peer-to-peer technology is a perfect
example of market exclusion due to regulatory lag: The illegal file-sharing service Napster
had perfected MP3 download technology as early as 1999, but it was not until four years
later that the law caught up with the technology to bring a legal version of digital
downloads to market. See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Rhapsody to Acquire Napster in Deal with Best
Buy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/
03/rhapsody-to-acquire-napster-in-deal-with-best-buy/.
118 For a fuller critique of the influence of custom on intellectual property law, see, for
example, Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,
93 VA. L. REv. 1899 (2007).
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a. Gains
A statutory per-play rate, such as that contained in § 114,
misaligns incentives between licensees and licensors. In the case of
sound recordings, record labels want as much airtime as possible to
promote their artists and boost album sales, while a per-play royalty
encourages broadcasters to minimize costs by playing as little music as
possible.1 19 In contrast, a rate set as a share of revenues-such as that
established in the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal-encourages
more plays, which in turn induces more listeners, leading to a higher
per-ad rate since advertisers will pay more for ads they believe will
reach a larger audience.120 More plays also mean more promotion for
the record labels, who are encouraged to offer broadcasters more (and
perhaps exclusive) content, which further attracts advertisers, and so
on.
Private ordering also accomplishes another important goal where
the statutory license fails: It fosters a mutually cooperative
relationship between parties whose businesses are interdependent.
Terrestrial radio may be in decline,121 but digital radio is growing
quickly. Advertising revenues stemming from digital radio are
expected to grow from $713 million in 2011 to $1.55 billion in 2021 or
from 1.5% of broadcaster revenues in 2007 to over 7% by the end of
2021.122 Internet-only radio is forecasted to grow even faster from a
current market cap of roughly $293 million to over $1 billion by the
end of 2021.123 A traditional terrestrial broadcaster like Clear Channel
looking to expand into digital radio would be best served by
cooperative relationships with digital content owners-relationships
119 As Clear Channel CEO Robert Pittman put it:

I don't want to try and guess how much advertising I can sell-and if it's not
coming in fast enough, can I slow down the song plays? Or should I do an
interview show, or do more talk radio and news and sports, or maybe do more
pre-1972 music programming? That's just a bad way to run-and even more
importantly, try and build-a business. It encourages us to try and play as little
music as possible.
Christman, supra note 8.
120 There is a trade-off, as each additional play reduces the time available for running
paid advertising. The key in this model is to charge more for less (i.e., to charge more per
ad, but run fewer ads).
121 See, e.g., Richard Siklos, Changing Its Tune, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at C1
("[T]he prospects of radio companies have dimmed significantly since the late 1990's ....
Radio revenue growth has stagnated and the number of listeners is dropping. The amount
of time people tune into radio over the course of a week has fallen by 14 percent over the
last decade . . . .").
122 SNL KAGAN, supra note 92, at 2.
123 Id.
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that may afford them early and exclusive content with which they can
attract both advertisers and listeners.
Content licensors like Big Machine are also eager to expand their
revenue opportunities. This is a challenging time for these copyright
holders. Advances in technology and changes in consumer behavior
have decimated traditional recording industry business models, 124
forcing record labels to seek revenues in greener pastures-namely,
radio, which is often still credited with encouraging record sales. 125 A
cooperative relationship with broadcasters may ensure both better
product placement and more opportunities to share in the anticipated
growth of digital radio. A revenue share also sets up a cooperative
partnership in which the parties share both the risks and the rewards.
This marks a significant departure from (and improvement on) the
industry's standard digital model that consists of an equity
requirement, 126 an exorbitant advance for the licensor with no
consequence or responsibility for the fate of the licensee.127
The direct payment from Clear Channel to Big Machine also
obviates the need for a CRO. In addition to saving on administrative
costs, the parties get to control distribution of the royalties. 128 Sony/
ATV's withdrawal from ASCAP, discussed below in Part III.C.3, is
another recent example of circumvention that suggests this shift is not
an isolated rejection of the CRO model, adding further support to the
claim that the CRO model may not meet the needs of licensors and
licensees in a digital world.129
124 While the medium has evolved (from 8-tracks to vinyl to cassette tapes to CDs), the
traditional music business model of selling bundled, recorded music has stayed the same.
The digital revolution changed that by allowing for unbundling, or the purchase of
individual tracks for less than the cost of a full album.
125 See, e.g., Kristin Thomson, Does Radio Airplay Matter?, ARTIST REVENUE STREAMS
(May 7, 2012), http://money.futureofmusic.org/does-radio-airplay-matter/ (compiling data
which suggests, inter alia, that "[f]or some musicians, [radio] airplay is perceived as a major
driver of record sales and other revenue streams").
126 See, e.g., Arrington, supra note 105 (describing the distribution of monies to equityholding copyright owners).
127 See, e.g., Resnikoff, supra note 105 (discussing digital start-up Turntable.fm's
struggle with indifferent and disinterested content licensors).
128 For further discussion of the distributive justice concerns potentially arising from this
and proposed solutions, see Garcia, supra note 12, at 29-37, and infra Part II.B.2.b.
129 See Ben Sisario, Apple's Plans for Internet Radio Run Up Against Big Music
Publisher, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/28/apples-plans-for-internet-radio-come-up-against-big-music-publisher/ ("EMI
already withdrew its digital rights from Ascap, and Sony/ATV will follow suit with the rest
of its catalog, effective Jan 1[, 2013]."); see also supra note 104 (discussing the recent ruling
of In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013),
which may work to stem the proliferation of ASCAP withdrawals).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1148

[Vol. 89:1117

As discussed above in Part II.B.1, the statutory rate set under

§ 114 suffers from fluctuating rates, different rates for different
licensee types, and multiple rate-setting standards. This result is
largely unacceptable from a business perspective. In the words of
Clear Channel CEO Robert Pittman, "What we are really trying to do
is come up with a predictable model."' 30 Section 114's rate uncertainty
denies Clear Channel a stable, predictable basis on which to sell its
new digital business model to shareholders.
By applying different rate-setting standards, § 114 also denies
prospective licensees the security of knowing they are paying the right
rate. Even under the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard, not all
services will fall neatly into one of the enumerated categories of
service, especially at the current pace of technological development.
Such is the downside of setting different rates for different types of
licensees without the ability to easily and effectively add new types.
Prospective licensees must simply choose the closest category fit and
hope they are not challenged (and found owing) later. In addition,
there is no assurance that a rate set this year will remain in effect for
the duration of the licensee's contemplated use. In most cases, it will
not.131 Nor do the parties have any assurance that pending legislation
or litigation affecting the statutory rate will not pass or be decided
during the contemplated license duration. For Clear Channel and Big
Machine, private ordering avoids this unpredictability altogether and
allows them a stable platform on which to build their respective
businesses.
With regard to accommodation of new technology and business
models, statutory licenses simply cannot be amended fast enough to
keep up. Adjustment and modification of private terms, on the other
hand, is generally much easier to facilitate. In theory, CROs can
accommodate such change, but in practice they do not.132 Privately
determined valuations are considerably more responsive than the
statutory regime in addressing the frequent and relentless advances in
Christman, supra note 8.
131 Statutory rates fluctuate annually and are set in five-year increments. See supra Part
II.B.1 (explaining the rate-setting procedure under 17 U.S.C. § 801).
132 ASCAP, for example, adjusts its blanket license rate annually using the Consumer
Price Index instead of responding to market changes and technological developments. See,
e.g., ASCAP, BLANKET CONCERT AND RECITAL (BCON): 2013 RATE SCHEDULE 1,
available at http://www.ascap.com/-/media/files/pdf/licensing/report-forms/concert/
blanketconcert.pdf ("The annual license rate under Schedule II, and the minimum annual
fee for each calendar year . . . shall be the license fee for the preceding calendar year,
adjusted in accordance with the increase in the Consumer Price Index - All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) between the preceding October and the next preceding
130

October . . . .").
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technology inherent in the content industries. This is because,
relatively speaking, private valuations are easily and cheaply revised.
If Clear Channel wants to run a trial of a new product, it need simply
negotiate a rate and term with Big Machine, who now has every
incentive to cooperate for the good of the new venture.
Finally, all parties under a statutory license pay the same rate and
operate under the same terms, regardless of the particular content and
the circumstances of its use. Under § 114, therefore, in a result the
author can only term sacrilege, a stream of Bob Dylan's Love Sick133
earns the same digital performance royalty as a stream of PSY's
Gangnam Style. 134 Even (resentfully) putting aside the subjectivity of
musical taste, § 114 does not (and cannot) reflect the market value of
the individual pieces of content that it governs given that the statutory
rate is one-size-fits-all. 135 In addition, since the digital performance
license for sound recordings was established simultaneously with the
creation of streaming music services, a real market for streaming
cannot be said to exist, much less one that differentiates among
content and uses. As a result, even where the CRB is charged with
taking market valuations into account in its adjustment of rates, it in
fact has no such valuations to consider.
Private ordering, on the other hand, allows for tailoring terms to
fit the contemplated content and use, thereby alleviating concerns
presented by the one-size-fits-all nature of a statutory licensing
regime. In this way, private ordering supports the creation and
dissemination of the best (i.e., most valuable) content, as determined
by the market, thereby producing more desirable outcomes insofar as
the parties are (at least in theory) constrained by the discipline of a
competitive market.
As part of their private deal, Big Machine, for instance, might
wish to charge Clear Channel one price for a spin of Taylor Swift's We
Are Never Ever Getting Back Together on its iHeart radio service as

part of a broader Taylor Swift campaign that includes an exclusive
prestream of her new album, while charging CBS a different price to
Love Sick, on TIME OUT OF MIND (Columbia Records 1997).
PSY, Gangnam Style, on PSY 6 (Six RULES), PART 1 (Universal Republic Records

133 BOB DYLAN,
134

2012).
135 Taste in music may not be as subjective as it seems at first blush. Section 114's failure
to account for valuation differences stands in stark contrast to industry practice outside of
the statutory license. iTunes, for example, prices different songs differently, according to
their respective market valuations. This pricing comes from the record labels. Mike
Masnik, As Rumored, Apple Gives Record Labels Variable iTunes Pricingin Exchange for
Ditching DRM, TECHDIRT (Jan. 6, 2009, 10:41 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20090106/1039003297.shtml. Thus, a song that music listeners in the aggregate are willing to
pay more for will sell for $1.29, others for $0.99, and still others for $0.69. Id.
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simply serve a single stream of the track to one of its digital radio
listeners upon request. The ability to price differentiate does not
afford Big Machine control over the price Clear Channel or CBS
ultimately charges its consumers, thereby raising no additional
antitrust concerns.136
Unlike price differentiation, which alters the price paid by
different consumers for the same product, product differentiation
allows for differences in quality to be accompanied by differences in
price. In the Clear Channel-Big Machine example, this allows Big
Machine to charge more for Taylor Swift's tried-and-proven brand of
radio-friendly pop, while offering a reduced price for up-and-coming
artists as a means of inducing licensees to give them airplay. Likewise,
Big Machine may be willing to accept a lower digital rate in exchange
for valuable metrics around listener behavior.
To this point, I have described the various efficiency gains
enjoyed by the parties to a private deal circumventing § 114.137 Do
these efficiencies extend to nonparties? To overall welfare? The
answer is both yes and no. Listeners benefit from greater access to
content, technology, and business models. Artists may benefit from
increased exposure and promotional opportunities. Technology
companies may find it easier to experiment with new services.
Moreover, to the extent private valuations like Clear Channel and Big
Machine's become an industry norm, thereby diminishing reliance on
the statutory license, society may also benefit from a decrease in the
social cost of legislation and litigation around rate setting.' 3 8
136 The usual antitrust concerns surrounding price differentiation still exist, however. In
a free market, price differentiation can allow a licensor to favor one licensee over another
by overcharging the less favored licensee, or even refusing to license, thereby potentially
running the affected licensee out of business. The parties could also agree to a mostfavored-nations clause, in which contracting parties agree to offer one another the same
terms agreed to with any other parties. In our example, these concerns are obviated by the
fact that the statutory license serves as a backup so that no licensee can be denied access to
content, nor have his rate increased beyond the statutory rate. To the extent a licensee
operating under the statutory license may not enjoy the special pricing that may result
from private ordering, this is no different than the status quo, wherein larger licensees (like
Clear Channel) have an advantage over smaller licensees when it comes to inducing a
licensor to circumvent the statutory license.
137 Of course, all of these efficiency gains could be deemed happy coincidence for
parties whose motivations in striking a private deal find root in rent-seeking behavior. By
this explanation, private parties might circumvent the statutory license even where the
resulting terms are not per se more efficient (and perhaps even less so) in order to take
advantage of some rent or other to be had. In the Clear Channel-Big Machine case, this
rent seeking might include the fifty percent increase on take-home royalties resulting from
a circumvention of § 114(g)(2). See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the drawbacks of private
ordering).
138 That said, industry-driven customs focused on decreasing litigation are not always
socially optimal. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 118, at 1952 ("[I]ncorporating [risk-averse
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On the other hand, smaller players may find themselves forced to
operate under a private valuation scheme ill suited to their business
model and without the means to negotiate otherwise. Artists and
songwriters may lose out on royalties that they were guaranteed under
the statutory license. In this sense, the parties are improving their own
positions to the potential detriment of others-making the overall
efficiency question somewhat more ambiguous. The next section
describes in greater detail some of the potential drawbacks of private
ordering.
b. Drawbacks
Despite its efficiency advantages, private ordering presents
several potential drawbacks, all of which illustrate the inherent
problem of social justice in the contract context. I have written
elsewhere on the potential distributive justice issues that private
ordering under a statutory license can raise and summarize them only
briefly here.139 One distributive justice concern is the potential to
legally bind nonparties. When parties circumvent § 114, they not only
circumvent the statutory royalty rate, but the entire section. This
includes § 114(g)(2), which mandates that royalties be paid directly to
third-party songwriters, recording artists, musicians, and vocalists (all
of whom are assumed to have assigned away their copyrights to an
intermediary).14 0 Since monies collected under privately negotiated
deals are not subject to this statutory distribution, parties to a private
deal are able to reduce (and even eliminate) royalties paid to these
third parties. The loss of this income can have a significant and
customs] greatly expands infringement findings under trademark, copyright, patent, and
publicity laws, while narrowing defenses to such infringements. Industry practices establish
a highly restrictive IP regime-one in which virtually nothing is free and no use is a fair
one.").
139 For a more in-depth analysis of these issues, see Garcia, supra note 12, at 27-28. The
brevity of treatment on distributive justice concerns should not be taken as commentary on
their import-rather, for the purposes of this Article's argument in favor of more private
ordering, I assume that these concerns have been ameliorated by the solutions previously
proposed.
140 Section 114(g)(2) directs that 50% of royalties collected under the statute be paid
directly to the artists themselves: 50% of receipts shall be paid to the copyright owner
(where the copyright owner is not the artist); 2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an
escrow account for distribution to nonfeatured musicians; 2.5% of receipts shall be
deposited in an escrow account for nonfeatured vocalists; and 45% of receipts shall be paid
to the featured recording artist on the sound recording. The legislative history indicates
that this was an intentional move on the part of Congress to protect and provide for artists
who might otherwise be taken advantage of by intermediaries. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-274,
at 23-24 (1995) (noting that the provision was intended "to ensure that a fair share of the
digital sound recording performance royalties goes to performers according to the terms of
their contracts").
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immediate financial impact on recording artists and songwriters, as
well as a long-term impact on creative output.
A statutory amendment requiring parties who circumvent the
statutory license to still adhere to such statutory distribution schemes
would obviate the potential for disenfranchisement of nonparties. It
would make the legal entitlement of creators to royalties an

inalienable right. 14 1
Private ordering can also raise concerns about the
misrepresentation of market rates in industries that have operated
under a statutory license since their inception, such as webcasting.
Because there is no real market for these industries, they are
especially susceptible to the imposition of privately determined
valuations as market rates. In the case of webcasting rates under
§ 114, for example, private values are frequently adopted by the
industry-either formally through the CRB's rate-setting procedure
or informally through evolving industry norms. 142 Awareness of this
tendency almost certainly influenced the completion of the Clear
Channel-Big Machine deal. As first to market, the parties get to set
the baseline rate that subsequent copycat deals will likely adopt,
which can lead to the establishment of an industry norm or custom.1 43
They can also present their private value to the CRB as the market
rate. If there is no competing value to challenge theirs, the parties may
thus be able to set the statutory rate privately.144
But see Garcia, supra note 12, at 31-34 (discussing the drawbacks of inalienability).
See id. at 28 (explaining that in the absence of a market rate, a private valuation can
gain industry acceptance to the point of becoming not only the de facto "market" rate, but
may even be adopted as the statutory rate in the absence of a competing value).
143 In addition to the critique offered by Professor Jennifer Rothman in the intellectual
property context, see supra note 118, the influence of custom on law has been questioned
in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of
Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999)
(criticizing the incorporation of commercial customs into Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code).
144 For example, digital music service DMX presented to the CRB the rate it reached
privately with music publisher Sony/ATV in 2007 and had it adopted. See, e.g., Broad.
Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's
adoption of DMX's proposed rates over those presented by ASCAP and BMI); Steve
Gordon, DMX vs. BMI Demonstrates that Digital Services May Use Direct Licensing to
Reduce Their Payments to the PROs but the Decision May Be Reversed on Appeal, FUTURE
Music Bus. (July 12, 2011), http://www.futureofthemusicbusiness.biz/2011/07/dmx-vs-bmidemonstrates-that-digital.html (discussing DMX's successful rate reduction campaign
based on the Sony/ATV direct deal campaign and asking "how can 550 direct licenses," the
number held by Sony/ATV, "be a benchmark for the true value of the PROs' blanket
licenses when those 550 licenses represent, in probability, only a tiny fraction of songs
represented by the PROs"). DMX did not, however, disclose the $2.7 million advance that
accompanied the rate it reached privately with Sony/ATV. See Brief of PetitionerAppellant BMI at 20-21, Broad. Music, 683 F.3d 32 (No. 10-3429) ("When DMX solicited
141

142
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One way to alleviate the potential for rate misrepresentation is
through a statutory amendment requiring full disclosure of the terms
and conditions surrounding a privately determined valuation.145 The
language of such an amendment would require complete and accurate
disclosure of the circumstances and conditions surrounding a private
valuation presented to the CRB. These disclosures could be filed and
made publicly available, much like a securities filing. While such a
statutory amendment would not completely obviate concerns about
misguided industry norms-since those can develop independent of
statutory adoption-and would undoubtedly invite objections around
proprietary business information, these privacy concerns could be
addressed in much the same way as they are in the securities filing
context. The disclosure requirement would at least make
gamesmanship of this sort more difficult by publicizing the relevant
deal terms surrounding establishment of a private rate.
Finally, as previously discussed with regard to CROs, penalty
default licenses may also suffer from adverse selection. For example,
Clear Channel may find it worthwhile to engage in private ordering
only for high-value artists and labels but not others. This leaves the
smaller players to the statutory license, potentially pushing all of the
"junk" (i.e., lower value) content there, leaving it less funded (since it
is collecting fewer membership fees and royalty shares) and less
efficient for those left to operate under it (since its blanket license is
inherently less valuable with larger members' content removed). This
concern, the subject of future work, is particularly complicated and
difficult to resolve, even with elimination of the collective. It is not
clear whether smaller, weaker parties are disadvantaged more when
going at it alone or when operating under a diminished collective. In
the meantime, the modest statutory amendments suggested in this
Part may work at least to ameliorate this impact by encouraging fair
rate setting, resulting in greater overall efficiency for the more
powerful parties without leaving weaker nonparties operating under
the statutory license worse off.146
Beyond these distributive justice concerns, private ordering also
raises inefficiency concerns. For a penalty default license to bring
about greater efficiency than a statutory license, the private ordering
direct licenses from smaller music publishers, it never told them about the advances it had
committed to pay Sony. . . . It nonetheless sought to induce publishers to enter into direct
licenses that did not include those substantial payments by assuring them they would be
treated the same as a sophisticated major publisher who had accepted the same deal."
(emphasis omitted)).
145 Garcia, supra note 12, at 35-37.
146 Id. at 38.
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that a penalty default encourages must itself be efficient. This is not
always the case-incomplete information, irrationality, asymmetry in
bargaining positions, industry circumstances, rent-seeking behavior,
and other externalities can all result in inefficient deal terms. The
good news is that such inefficiency is generally not sustainable. Parties
who strike inefficient deals will typically revise them or, at the very
least, not renew them. Even rent-seeking deals are curbed when the
rents run out.14 7 In addition, efficient deals tend to proliferate-such
as the copycat deals that followed the Clear Channel-Big Machine
deal-thereby establishing and enforcing more efficient industry
norms (and crowding out less efficient deals, including rent-seeking
ones).148 The systematic purging of inefficient private deal terms may
take time, however, and there is always the possibility that an
inefficient valuation will acquire industry norm status despite its
shortcomings. In addition, early-stage private dealmaking tends to be
concentrated among the larger, more powerful players in an industry
because they are both influential enough to induce bargaining and
financially secure enough to tolerate greater risk. As a result, a rate
deemed desirable by large, powerful parties may be imposed upon
smaller, less powerful parties who do not share the same valuation,
thereby exacerbating existing inequalities.14 9
The most cited efficiency drawback to private ordering is
transaction costs. 50 Individual negotiations require time, money, and
other resources. For this reason, collective valuation in the form of
statutory licensing and CROs has traditionally been the preferred
regime in industries engaged in en masse licensing. Section 114, for
example, was specifically enacted (like most statutory licenses) to
facilitate trade in music licensing, an industry in which individual
negotiation has historically been deemed either time or resource
147 See, e.g., E.C. Pasour, Jr., Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and
Implications, in 1 THE REVIEW OF AUSTRIAN EcoNoMics 123, 127 (Murray N. Rothbard
ed., 1987) (noting that the gains from rent-seeking can be "completely dissipated through
competitive rent-seeking activity").
148 As this section makes clear, what is good for one party may not be good for another.
It is unlikely, for example, that Big Machine's competitors were made better off by the deal
it struck with Clear Channel. But the economic efficiency question here is: Are they made
worse off? Not surprisingly, the answer is "maybe." This Article seeks to raise awareness of
this possible divergence between party and nonparty welfare.
149 See generally Rothman, supra note 118, at 1949 ("[Miany of the prevalent customs
are not developed with private parties' preferred allocations of rights in mind-much less
the optimal societal allocation of rights.").
150 For an example in the context of content licensing, see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark
A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 287 (2007) ("[W]hen transaction costs are
prohibitive, an efficient deal will not be struck . . . .").
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prohibitive (or both).151 Statutory licenses alleviate these transaction
costs by eliminating the need to engage in private deal making.
This bulk approach to licensing was useful for digital music
services when they were competing for bragging rights to "the largest
online catalogue of free music in the world."1 52 It is unclear, however,
whether (or to what extent) this rationale applies in today's market,
where it is commonly recognized that most users do not want more
content, but rather more convenient or more readily accessible
content. In other words, "[m]any consumers will say they want
everything, but actually don't." 53 To the extent amassing a fully
comprehensive catalog of content is no longer necessary, or even
desirable to start and grow a digital music service, the promise of easy
en masse licensing loses its appeal. Instead, today's services are
focused on "curating an ultimately limited selection,"154 a task best
accomplished through private ordering.
A temporal variation on the efficiency concern asks whether
certain of the advantages enjoyed by the parties will be diminished if
private ordering becomes the norm, as opposed to the exception. To
demonstrate, Big Machine may enjoy preferential placement of its
artists' songs on Clear Channel-owned radio stations as a result of
their private deal.15 5 Yet Warner has now signed a similar deal with
Clear Channel. 156 If most record labels come to strike similar deals
with Clear Channel, how valuable will this benefit be to Big Machine
151 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 28, at 1378 ("A compulsory licensing scheme represents
a real shortcut: it eliminates the need for private institution-building-a costly and timeconsuming process."); Reidel, supra note 52, at 770 ("The strongest argument for blanket
licenses was then and remains today the capacity of these licenses to deliver large savings
in transaction costs.").
152 Press Release, MySpace, MySpace Gains Over 1 Million Registrations with New
Music Player (Feb. 13, 2012), available at https://myspace.com/pressroom/pressreleases/
2012/11/21/myspace-gains-over-1-million-registrations-with-new-music-player; see also
Andrew Hampp, Exclusive: MySpace Launches New Music Player, Search Function,
Facebook Integration, BILLBOARDBIZ (Dec. 19, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://www.billboard.com/
biz/articles/news/1157474/exclusive-myspace-launches-new-music-player-search-functionfacebook ("[T]he size of MySpace's catalog is what [MySpace's parent company] Specific's
looking to tout the most.").
153 Paul Resnikoff, If Only People CaredAbout 'Comprehensive Catalogs' and Millions
of Songs. . ., DIGITAL Music NEWS (May 14, 2013), http://staging.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2013/05/14/care; see also, e.g., Portia Krebs, Digital Music Sales Soaring, Thanks
to Streaming and Downloads, USTELECOM (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ustelecom.org/
blog/digital-music-sales-soaring-thanks-streaming-and-downloads (comparing Spotify's
sixteen million songs to Pandora's one million songs and noting that "Pandora argues it's
quality, not quantity, that distinguishes their collection").
154 Resnikoff, supra note 153.
155 The perceived value of that preferential placement may well have motivated Big
Machine to accept a lower digital royalty rate.
156 Sisario, supra note 10.
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(or any of the labels)? In other words, how does replication affect a
private deal's value and, by extension, its efficiency? It remains to be
seen, but two things are possible, and perhaps even likely. First,
proliferation may lead to efficient industry norms that benefit all
players (assuming penalty default licenses are used to mitigate
gamesmanship). Second, even if some reduction of value were to
occur, the parties would not be worse off than they are under the
statutory license, which remains available as a fallback option.
Despite these potential efficiency and distributive justice
concerns, private ordering still provides a marked improvement over
the inefficiencies of § 114. Yet the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal
was the first to circumvent this long-standing statutory licensing
regime. The next section examines the challenges to circumventing a
statutory license through private ordering.
III
THE PAST: DEFAULTING INTO INEFFICIENCY

The inefficiencies of § 114 described above are not new. Indeed,
it is safe to say they have existed since the statute's inception. Even so,
the statutory license was not circumvented until the Clear
Channel-Big Machine deal. So why did no one circumvent it before?
And why are some parties still not doing so now? This Part considers
some of the reasons parties may continue to operate under a regime
that does not best serve their needs.
A.

Challenges to Circumvention

For all of its efficiency benefits, private ordering in the shadow of
a statutory license faces some formidable challenges. The most
obvious obstacle to circumventing certain statutory licenses is a legal
prohibition against doing so. Although § 114 explicitly contemplates
an opt-out for licensors and licensees of sound recordings,'5 7 not all
statutory licenses give parties this authorization. Cable broadcast and
satellite television, for example, are obligated to operate under their
respective statutes,158 which do not permit private ordering. However,
157 It authorizes "copyright owners of sound recordings and any entities performing
sound recordings" to alternatively "negotiate and agree upon the royalty rates and license
terms and conditions for the performance of such sound recordings and the proportionate
division of fees paid among copyright owners, and may designate common agents on a
nonexclusive basis to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive payments." 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1)
(2012).
158 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (governing broadcast cable); id. § 119 (governing satellite
television).
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the legal barrier explanation does not explain parties' reluctance to
circumvent § 114.
A better explanation in the case of § 114 might be inequality in
bargaining power. It can be difficult for a smaller, less powerful
licensor to muster the time and energy required for a direct deal with
a more powerful licensee. This inequality may even lead to adverse
selection in the statutory license as larger, more powerful licensees opt
out, potentially leaving smaller parties with a less effective system. 159
Yet inequality existed between Clear Channel and Big Machine and
they managed to overcome it.
Another challenge to circumventing certain statutory licenses
stems from their default nature. One thing the competing law and
economics literature on defaults seems to agree on is that defaults
have a propensity to be "sticky"-that is, parties operating under a
default regime tend to stick with the default. The sources of this
reluctance are varied. One view suggests that contracting parties tend
to view defaults as endowments and claims that there is a prevailing
preference for that which is perceived as the status quo. 160 No one
wants to give up something they have a right to, nor do they want to
lose something that others (especially competitors) are getting. Parties
are thus likely to prefer a default that they perceive as representative
of the status quo, regardless of its inefficiency. To overcome this
resistance, the incentive must be sufficiently strong: "[P]arties will not
contract around a default contract term when it would only be
marginally efficient for them to do so . . .. They are, however, likely to

contract around the default term when doing so would be
overwhelmingly efficient . . . ."161 Professor Daniel Kahneman has
explained the preference for defaults as one of convenience-it may
simply be easier not to endure the cognitive strain of making an
alternative decision. 162
Another view suggests that parties may stick with a default in
order to signal (or not signal) something about themselves. 163 The
159 This loss in efficacy, as mentioned in Part II.B.2.b, results from both less monies
being collected in the form of membership fees and royalty shares and from a less robust
catalog that lowers the value of a blanket license.
160 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608, 675 (1998) ("[Parties might] fail to contract around inefficient defaults when
their preference for maintaining the status quo relative to alternative states swamps their
preference for the alternative contract term relative to the default term.").
161 Id. at 666.

162 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN,

THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 348 (2011) (discussing the

stronger emotions that result from deviating from the default option).
163 See, e.g., Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON.
432, 432 (1992) (finding that, among other reasons for contractual incompleteness, "an
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classic example of this is the professional athlete who refrains from
asking for an injury clause so as to avoid sending a signal (whether
true or not) of his propensity for injury, thereby lowering his
contractual leverage.164 In turn, the default of "no injury clause" in
professional athlete contracts grows stickier the less frequently it is
circumvented. Similar arguments have been made in the context of
social norms and relational contract theory. Under this view, a party
may be reluctant to opt out of a default for fear that doing so may
make him appear "less reliable or more contentious" than similarly
situated parties.165
These theories converge to create a self-reinforcing norm against
default circumvention. Conversely, it follows that where opting out is
viewed as normal, a default may lose its stickiness. In their work in
this area, Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow have
determined that "the more common it becomes to propose opting out
of a particular term, the less reason there will be for the recipient of
the proposal to be suspicious, and so the norm against private
tailoring should weaken."1 66 In other words, the frequency with which
an opt-out is seen in a given market or industry can likewise have a
self-reinforcing or self-perpetuating quality, thereby reducing the
suspicion associated with a party's request for private ordering. In the
Betamax case, for example, Sony sought to support their new timeshifting recording technology by citing that "representatives of
professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey testified that
they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for
home use."1 67 They secured sign-off from the National Hockey
League, then Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
Association, and finally the National Football League.168 Each

individual may refrain from including a particular clause in a contract in order to signal his
type").
164 Id. at 433.
165 Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
59, 72 (1993). This rationale can be extended to contract pricing as well. A party may not
seek a specific performance clause, for instance, where it would "excite suspicion (and a
high price)." Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory
Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 388
(1990).
166 Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 651, 667-68 (2006).

167 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
168 Id. at 424.
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approval made it less risky for the other organizations to
participate. 169
The Clear Channel-Big Machine deal also provides an excellent
example of this bandwagon principle. Despite the decades-long
existence of a statutory authorization for circumventing § 114, no one
wanted to lose the statutory royalty to which they were legally
entitled, or the legal right to not pay royalties on terrestrial plays, and
so the default grew sticky. However, once the first circumvention was
completed, similar deals followed in short order.170
Ben-Shahar and Pottow suggest that "harsh enough penalty
defaults can overcome the stickiness effect, and once that effect is
overcome, the increased prevalence of deviation will, in and of itself,
attenuate the stickiness of the default rule even further."17 1In the case
of the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, uncertainty about the
establishment of a statutory terrestrial performance right acted as a
harsh enough penalty to overcome even an ingrained resistance to
circumvention. As discussed in Part I, the threat of a statutory
terrestrial performance right has persisted for decades, but never in so
concrete and imminent a form as now. On September 25, 2013,
following through on promises made over the last year,
Representative Mel Watt introduced the Free Market Royalty Act.172
It would amend 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) to grant a terrestrial performance
right to sound recording copyright holders. 73
Unlike previous iterations of a performance rights act, this one
comes in the midst of industry-wide support for what the Copyright
Office is calling the "next great copyright act."174 Adding to the
credibility of this latest legislative threat, Clear Channel's defection
from the broadcaster lobby not only weakens the NAB's traditional
position that broadcasters should not have to pay a performance right,
since Clear Channel has openly agreed to do so, but also puts a
significant dent in the organization's lobbying coffers. 75
169 For a discussion of technology diffusion and the bandwagon effect, see Gianvito
Lanzolla & Fernando F. Suarez, Closing the Technology Adoption-Use Divide: The Role of
Contiguous User Bandwagon, 38 J. MGMT. 836 (2012).
170 See supra note 10 (listing sources discussing similar deals).
171 Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 166, at 669 (citing Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 800-01
(1995)).
172 H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Rep. Watt's Statement, supra note 75
(discussing the Free Market Royalty Act).
173 Rep. Watt's Statement, supra note 75.
174 Pallante, supra note 73, at 315.
175 As noted by Recording Academy President Neil Portnow: "Congress has shown a
sincere interest in solving this problem, and with Clear Channel's recognition of the
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The emerging prevalence of copycat deals following the Clear
Channel-Big Machine deal suggests something further as well: The
penalty of being the odd person out bolsters the punitive nature of the
default (turning it, in effect, into a penalty default). As more and more
record labels sign on to the Clear Channel deal in order to secure
terrestrial performance rights for their artists, a record label that
refrains-perhaps because its business model cannot support a lowerthan-statutory digital rate-may lose its artists to another label. In
other words, industry norms can be defaults, too. Building on this, the
next section considers three possible approaches for overcoming
stickiness.
B.

Overcoming Stickiness

The Clear Channel-Big Machine deal and its progeny
demonstrate the ability of parties to overcome inequality in
bargaining power and the tendency of defaults toward stickiness. As
such private ordering can improve on the statutory license, the
question is then how best to encourage more of it. This section
outlines a few possible approaches to overcoming inequality and
stickiness.
1.

The Regulatory Inaction Approach

A regulatory inaction (or free market) approach would do away
with the statutory license and any extant CROs altogether.176 In the
absence of a statutory license, parties would be forced into private
ordering to secure a license. This approach saves administrative costs
associated with the establishment and maintenance of a statutory
licensing regime. Moreover, the private ordering that results may
bring all of the aforementioned efficiency benefits-increased
cooperation, rate predictability and suitability, flexibility in response
to technological change, and value differentiation-but only for those
parties who are in a position to bargain for it. Those without the
terrestrial performance right, continued opposition by the NAB will now ring hollow on
Capitol Hill." Christman, supra note 82.
176 Alternatively, free market advocates might argue for doing away with just the
statutory license and then allowing either existing CROs to remain in place or new CROs
to take shape. In addition to the arguments against CROs' efficiency presented in Part I,
this would not truly comport with a free market approach, as CROs are simply another
form of government intervention. This is especially true in the case of PROs, where both
ASCAP and BMI (the largest two in the industry) operate under consent decrees. See, e.g.,
United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (renewing ASCAP's consent decree). Only by eliminating both
the statutory license and CROs are parties forced to engage in private ordering to secure a
license.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 2014]1

PENALTY DEFAULT LICENSES

1161

requisite size or market power to attract a direct deal may be left
without the ability to secure a license at all.
In other words, the free market approach increases efficiency by
increasing private ordering but only as to those parties with the ability
and wherewithal to participate. Without the access guaranteed by the
statutory license, smaller, less powerful parties will be further
disadvantaged vis-A-vis larger parties with greater bargaining power.
They may not be able to secure equally favorable rates, if they are
even able to secure rights at all. A licensor planning to enter the
licensee market, for instance, could effectively deny access to
potential competitors altogether.
In a situation where an established artist like Taylor Swift is in a
position to negotiate for preferential treatment, but not a relative
unknown like Joe Schmo,'177 free market advocates might respond that
Joe Schmo is in no worse of a position in this context than he would be
under the current statutory regime. 78 The same might be said for
local radio station WXYZ.179 To the extent WXYZ is unable to reach
the same terms with Big Machine that Clear Channel has, this is
arguably no different than Clear Channel getting an exclusive
interview with Taylor Swift as part of a larger marketing package with
which WXYZ is unable to compete.
The issue of access, however, raises different concerns. In a
scenario where the statutory license, however inefficient, is left in
place, WXYZ is at least guaranteed access to content that enables it to
attempt to compete in the market. Eliminating this guaranteed access
reduces competition, which can result in fewer innovations, fewer
service options, and ultimately higher prices for consumers. For this
reason, the regulatory inaction approach is not optimal.
2.

The Regulatory Action Approach

A regulatory action approach might seek to either fix or improve
upon the extant statutory license without removing it altogether. An
optimistic attempt to fix the statute is not practicable, however, as
most of the inefficiencies associated with statutory licenses are
inherent and therefore cannot be effectively remedied without
177 Joe Schmo is a fictional recording artist and any resemblance to an actual recording
artist is entirely coincidental.
178 This is not to suggest, however, that the copyright laws-with their constitutional
mandate to promote creation and innovation-do not protect or improve the situation of
Joe Schmo. It merely suggests that, in economic terms, Joe Schmo is not made worse off in
this scenario.
179 WXYZ is also a fictional entity for illustrative purposes only and bears no relation to
any existing radio station.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

1162

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1117

dismantling the function of the license itself. For instance, the primary
purpose of a statutory license is to reduce transaction costs associated
with multiple negotiations by setting a fixed rate and terms for all
prospective licensees.180 As such, a statutory license cannot set
different rates for different content or uses in response to market
valuations. This would, by definition, require observation of pricing
behavior in an actual market-a practice precluded in large part by
the existence of the statutory license itself, which results in the
absence of an actual market. CROs fare no better since, at best, they
set a blanket rate to cover all content in a given catalog.
Likewise, the fix for a fluctuating rate is replacing it with a static
one. While this might resolve the unpredictability problem, it would
substitute a different deficiency: lack of suitability. Without the ability
to adapt to evolving technologies and business models, a permanent
statutory rate would quickly fail to serve the needs of licensees and
licensors, especially in the fast-moving digital context.
The fix for divergent rate-setting standards is to set a single
standard applicable across the board. Recently proposed (and failed)
legislation to this end, 18 ' shows that the only thing further apart than
the rate-setting standards themselves are the opposing positions on
such standards taken by industry interests.
Finally, inflexibility and inability to respond in a timely manner to
changes in technology and business models stem from the legislative
process itself. Changes to statutes require amendments to be drafted,
presented, and approved. This process takes time. The statutory ratesetting process is not, and cannot be made, sufficiently nimble to keep
pace with the speed of technological development.1 82
The inherent inefficiencies of the existing statutory regime cannot
be fixed if the statutory license is to retain its function. Its continued
functionality is especially important for those parties who depend on
the statutory license for access to content. It does not follow, however,
that the statutory licensing regime cannot be improved despite its
inherent inefficiencies.
A more attainable, improvement-focused variation on the
regulatory action approach would be to leave the current statutory
180 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 28, at 1295 (arguing that legislatively mandated
licensing reduces transaction costs by eliminating or reducing haggling and implementing
schemes that often come with built-in administrative support).
181 These include the Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong.
(2012), and the Interim Fairness in Radio Starting Today Act of 2012, H.R. -, 112th Cong.
(2012), available at http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/files/documents/
NADLER_153_xml.pdf;. See also supra Part II.B.1.
182 See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (discussing this issue in the context of
recent webcast legislation).
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licensing regime in place, thereby continuing to afford access to all
comers, but with modifications (as opposed to fixes) that encourage
private ordering. There are several ways to accomplish this. One
approach would be to leave the statute in place but add an affirmative
penalty for noncircumvention, perhaps in the form of a fine or tax that
applies whenever a party refuses to deal privately with another party
who presents a deal in good faith. However, in addition to the
potential subjectivity of a good-faith determination in this context, the
problem with this approach is that the parties left to function under
the statutory license-a group that might predictably include those
smaller and less powerful players who are unable to secure direct
deals-will only be further disadvantaged vis-A-vis those parties in a
position to circumvent for a better deal.
Alternatively, in a variation on the theme, the statutory license
could be left in place, but with an added incentive-perhaps in the
form of a tax break or lump sum payment-granted to parties who
circumvent the statutory license. However, in addition to the public
costs of such a program, this approach still disadvantages smaller,
weaker parties who are unable to attract a private deal vis-A-vis those
who are able to claim the reward for doing so.
Both of these approaches present anticompetitive concerns
insofar as they further disadvantage weaker parties vis-A-vis stronger
ones. A balanced approach-the one used by penalty default
licenses-leaves the statutory license in place and uses existing
uncertainty to incentivize both parties toward circumvention and
private ordering, while also minimizing concerns about
gamesmanship.
C.

The Role of Uncertainty

One way to induce circumvention would involve setting a
punitive statutory rate that favors one party or the other (e.g., a very
low statutory rate to favor licensees or a very high statutory rate to
favor licensors). 183 Even assuming equal bargaining power-an
aspirational assumption at best-an overly punitive rate could have
the unintended consequence of entrenching the favored party in the
statutory license. To the extent a statutory license is intended to
guarantee access to all comers, an overly punitive rate for licensees
could prove prohibitively high for smaller players with less bargaining
power and effectively limit, or even eliminate, access to content for
183 Another conceivable arrangement might include the imposition of a punitively high
rate (i.e., disfavoring the licensee) that is partly channeled to a charity, for instance, so that
it does not necessarily favor the licensor.
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those parties. At the very least, such a regime leaves open the
possibility of gamesmanship by setting the parties on an unequal
playing field.
Unlike a punitive rate, an uncertain rate is unpalatable to both
parties,184 making it an effective means of encouraging circumvention
without exacerbating concerns about gamesmanship. 185 Where most
of the literature on efficiency advocates increasing stability,18 6 this
Article makes the contrary case: To increase efficiency in statutory
licensing, legislators should use bounded uncertainty as a means of
encouraging private ordering. By presenting both parties with an
uncertain ex post result, uncertainty encourages more ex ante private
ordering. Bounded uncertainty also increases parties' incentives to
circumvent an inefficient penalty default license for fear of ending up
worse off. Concededly, uncertainty has existed in the music industry
for decades without bringing efficiency gains. The next section
explains why this uncertainty has not prompted private ordering until
now.
1.

Uncertainty Then and Now

Among the statutory licenses for certain types of copyrightprotected content, the statutory license for sound recordings enjoys
the dubious distinction of an especially contentious and unstable
evolution. The history of royalties for Internet radio began when the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(DPRSRA)187 granted the owners of copyrights on sound recordings a
limited right to control digital performance of their recordings.188
Prior to this, only the owner of a copyright on the musical composition
underlying a sound recording enjoyed this right.189
As with subsequent legislation aimed at governing royalties for
sound recordings, the DPRSRA's effectiveness was limited by its
184 This assumes equal risk tolerance, the most likely scenario in a case such as this one
where the parties are participating in the same industry and facing the same market
conditions.
185 This might suggest "uncertain" (as opposed to "penalty") default licenses as a more
accurate description. As in the case of penalty default rules, however, it is precisely this
uncertainty that makes the default license a penalty default.
186 Supra note 21.

187 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. §§ 106, 114-115); see 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (discussing the
DPRSRA).
188 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (granting an exclusive right, "in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission" (emphasis added)).
189 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the history of statutory licensing for sound
recordings).
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inability to predict the future-specifically, the evolution of adsupported Internet services. The DPRSRA exempted
"nonsubscription" digital audio transmissions from the statutory
license. 190 In other words, Internet radio services whose users paid a
subscription fee had to pay a compulsory performance royalty,
whereas Internet radio services whose users watched ads in lieu of
subscribing were exempt from paying royalties. The DPRSRA's
successor, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 19'
attempted to correct this oversight by revising the definition of
exempt services but ended up compounding confusion by leaving
unanswered the question of whether interactive services fell under the
revised definition. When petitions to the Copyright Office asking for
clarification of this issue were declined, 192 licensors and licensees were
forced to either work it out-i.e., come to a private agreement on
terms-or face arbitration under the newly established Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) tasked with determining and
adjusting "reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments." 193
The first in a series of such arbitrations, known as Webcasting I,
resulted in a CARP ruling 94 that set rates for the period from 1998
through 2002.195 These rates were immediately deemed unworkable
by the industry. 196 In response, the Library of Congress arbitrarily
190 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (2012).
191 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in sections of 17
U.S.C.).
192 After the passage of the DMCA left the status of interactive services uncertain,
webcasters asked the Copyright Office for a ruling that a service is not interactive "merely
by virtue of offering the consumer some degree of influence over the streamed
programming." Petition of the Digital Media Association (DiMA) for Rulemaking, Section
114 Definition of Interactive Service, Docket No. RM 2000-4 (Copyright Office Apr. 17,
2000), available at http://www.copyright.gov/carplDiMApetition.pdf. This request was
denied: "In light of the rapidly changing business models emerging in today's digital
marketplace, no rule can accurately draw the line demarcating the limits between an
interactive service and a noninteractive service." Public Performance of Sound Recordings:
Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,330, 77,332 (Copyright Office Dec. 11, 2000)
(denial of petition for rulemaking) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201).
193 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012).
194 Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, No. 2000-9 (Copyright Office Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates.pdf.
195 Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,266 (Copyright
Office July 8, 2002) (final rule) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 261).
196 See, e.g., Online Radio Plans 'Silent' Protest of Fees, Hous. CHRON., May 1, 2002, at
3B (noting webcasters' claim that the proposed royalty rates would put them out of
business); see also David Ho, Royalty Rates for Internet Radio Rejected, WASH. POST, May
22, 2002, at E2 (reporting more claims that royalty rates would force webcasters to shut
down).
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halved the rate set by CARP, 197 to no better reception. 198 Congress's
response, the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004
(CRDRA), replaced CARP with three Copyright Royalty Judges
acting collectively as the CRB. 199 Unfortunately, subsequent ratesetting procedures under the CRB proved no more effective at
predicting the technological future. The rate-setting process known as
Webcasting II increased the webcasting royalty rate and added a $500
minimum administrative fee "per channel or station." 200 While this
cost was reasonable for the average terrestrial broadcaster, which
typically has only one radio station, it was an enormous burden to
Internet radio services such as Pandora, which allow their users to
create an unlimited number of stations. The Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2008201 came about in direct response to this and effectively
authorized SoundExchange to negotiate alternate fee agreements with
webcasters adversely affected by Webcasting 11.202 The Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2009,203 commonly known as the "PurePlay
Settlement," 2 0 4 extended the time allotted for these agreements to be
reached. 205 Its terms, which set different rates for different sized
webcasters and for different business models, expire in 2015,206
thereby doing little to improve the pervasive rate uncertainty
surrounding performance royalties.
197 The Copyright Office reduced the CARP-determined royalty rate of $0.14 per play
to $0.07 per play. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital
Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,243.
198 See, e.g., Christopher Stern, Curtain Call for Webcasts?: Some Decry Order to Pay
Royalties to Musicians, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at El (discussing continued concern
from webcasters postadjustment).
199 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (2012).
200 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,097 (Copyright Royalty Bd. May 1, 2007) (final rule) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
§ 380) (setting digital performance rates).
201 Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (2008).
202 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-941 (2009) (citing as the legislation's impetus "the substantial
controversy concerning a June 2007 Copyright Office Royalty Board decision").
203 Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926.
204 The term "Pureplay" refers to a commercial webcaster whose revenues are earned
primarily through webcasting. See Pureplay Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.
soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2014). The statutory rates and terms for this category of webcaster are
described at 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796-802 (July 17, 2009).
205 See 154 Cong. Rec. S10186-02 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("The bill simply extends the time ... during which the parties can negotiate their own
rates, even after the CRB proceeding, and will permit any deal that is negotiated by that
time to bind the interested parties.").
206 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed.
Reg. 34,796, 34,799, app. art. 4.2(b)(i) (Copyright Office July 17, 2009).
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Given this tumultuous background, it is reasonable to ask why
rate uncertainty concerning the future state of the law is prompting
private action now, as in the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, but did
not prompt such activity earlier. Why have parties only now begun to
circumvent § 114, rather than in 2005 when Internet radio services like
Pandora were saddled with unreasonable and disproportionate perstation fees? The answer is one of both timing and degree. First,
terrestrial performance rights are the last unknown in sound recording
royalties, one that can be avoided altogether by beating the CRB to
the punch with a privately established valuation. 207 Parties may not
have made the leap to circumvention initially because they had faith,
however nalve, in the then-newly established CRB rate-setting
process. 208 Having learned the hard way that things do not always go
their way when left to the CRB, parties today may be more willing to
give private ordering a go. This is especially so where legislation seems
imminent and they have no other means to insure against loss as a
result of any change in their legal rights. 209
Second, as a circumventable statutory license, § 114 is effectively
a default, which, as discussed above, tends to be sticky. Uncertainty
can provide a much-needed push to force an initial break with the
perceived status quo. Moreover, in addition to uncertainty about the
future legal status of terrestrial performance rights, digital technology
provided yet another push in this case. Changes in digital technology
have led to increased incentives for cooperation between licensees
and licensors, who now find their fates increasingly interdependent.
For example, the ability of a digital music streaming service to attract
new customers depends, in large part, upon the content that it is able
to license from the music labels. The music labels' streaming revenues,
in turn, depend significantly upon the service's ability to attract and
retain paying customers.
The evolution in digital technology has also led to changes in
consumer preferences and expectations, shifting the emphasis from
207 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the power of uncertainty
and how the threat of government regulation has encouraged private licensing and greater
market efficiency).
208 The CRB was established in 2004 by the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (codified in relevant part at 17 U.S.C.

§ 114(f)).

209 While protection against economic change is readily available, there is currently no
means of purchasing private insurance against future legal changes, and it has been
suggested that this void might be filled by government-provided "transition relief."
Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition
Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 435 (2010) (finding "the moribund private market for
regulatory insurance . . . unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution" and suggesting that
instead "the government might provide meaningful transition relief").
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terrestrial radio to digital radio (in the case of broadcasters) and from
physical CDs to digital MP3s and streams (in the case of record
labels). With the number of terrestrial listeners declining each year,210
it is now more important than ever for a broadcaster to build a digital
business. Likewise, with album sales in a steady and undeniable
decline, 211 record labels are more eager than ever for alternate
sources of revenue.
It helps too that, unlike previous incarnations, 212 the current
uncertainty surrounding terrestrial performance rights is a bounded
uncertainty limited to rate, as opposed to a rampant uncertainty about
everything from exemption status to the application of administrative
fees. At the same time, there has been a notable shift in consumer
preference from terrestrial to digital radio that continues to grow with
improvements in technology and service offerings. 213 This creates
uncertainty about future digital business models. In other words, there
is now both more to lose and more to gain.
Furthermore, the most recent collective webcasting agreement,
the PurePlay Settlement, can be viewed as a type of "semiprivate"
ordering-a "first draft" of sorts for the private ordering around
terrestrial performance rights that is emerging as a natural extension
of this inclination to avoid an unknown rate in favor of a negotiated
one. The PurePlay Settlement was the industry's last chance to
privately negotiate a digital performance rate and, with the missteps
of Webcasting I & II looming large in the collective memory, a deal
210 See, e.g., Laura Santhanam et al., Audio: Digital Drives Listener Experience, in PEW
CTR., THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2013 (2013), available at http://
stateofthemedia.org/2013/audio-digital-drives-listener-experience ("Financially, the picture
does not bode well for traditional radio . . .. Online-only and satellite radio, on the other
hand, had better years than in the past, with more positive long-term forecasts. And new
legislation under consideration by Congress could be an added windfall to many onlineonly stations."); Streaming Music Is Gaining on TraditionalRadio Among Younger Music
Listeners, NPD GROUP (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/pressreleases/streaming-music-is-gaining-on-traditional-radio-among-younger-music-listeners/
(noting that, for the fourth quarter of 2012, "[a]s Internet-radio listening rose among [the
13 to 35 age group], listening to AM/FM radio . . . declined 2 percentage points").
RESEARCH

211 See, e.g., Ed Christman, U.S. Album Sales Hit HistoricLows, BILLBOARDBIZ (Aug. 2,

2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/5631721/usalbum-sales-hit-historic-lows ("U.S. album sales have hit new historic lows . . . .").
212 See discussion supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the rampant uncertainty surrounding
previous incarnations).
213 See, e.g., supra note 210 (observing an increase in Internet radio listening and
concurrent decrease in traditional radio listening). In recognition of the increasingly
central role that its digital radio service, iHeartRadio, plays in the Clear Channel business,
the company recently announced plans to change its name to iHeart Media. Ben Sisario,
Clear Channel Renames Itself iHeartMedia in Nod to Digital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/business/medialembracing-digital-brand-clear-channelrenames-itself-iheartmedia.html.
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was eventually reached with the specific aim of avoiding the
imposition of a rate set by the CRB.2 14
The same can be said in the case of terrestrial performance rights,
where the Free Market Royalty Act, a reincarnation of the
Performance Rights Act of 2009 that would have set a statutory
terrestrial performance royalty, was introduced by Representative
Mel Watt on September 25, 2013.215 Private ordering around
terrestrial performance rights is the industry's chance to get the deal it
wants, or at least a deal it can tolerate, before a statutory rate is set. 216
Absent the threat of an imminent and unknown terrestrial
performance right, however, and "[kinowing that they could continue
to operate and rely on arbitration, neither [webcasters nor the
recording industry] had particularly strong incentives to reach a
voluntary agreement." 2 17 The key to using uncertainty to improve
efficiency is thus one of degree. The brand of rampant uncertainty
seen in Webcasting I & II breeds mistrust and industry instability. On
the other hand, bounded uncertainty-such as uncertainty about the
future legal status of terrestrial performance rights and uncertainty
about future digital business models-can be used to ameliorate such
instability. The next section will show how uncertainty minimizes one
of the largest concerns around private ordering: gamesmanship.
2.

The Uncertainty Advantage

While this Article presents a case for bounded uncertainty, such
uncertainty does not guarantee efficiency. 218 Although the level of
uncertainty need not be equal for both parties, uncertainty that only
affects one party or affects one party too disproportionately can result
in inefficiency and gamesmanship. Penalty default licenses mitigate
214 See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (giving the
parties a thirty-day extension); Jeff Leeds, Reprieve on Royalty Increase Being Pursuedfor
Internet Radio, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/14/
business/14music.html ("[T]he reprieve [referring to the stay] came as federal lawmakers
had begun discussing legislation that would enact reduced fees [referring to the CRBdetermined rate].").
215 H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Rep. Watt's Statement, supra note 75
(discussing the Free Market Royalty Act). Particularly in light of the title of the legislation
(the Free Market Royalty Act), it should be kept in mind that the only "market" rate that
exists for terrestrial performance is Clear Channel's.
216 The idea that government action can encourage, and even facilitate, private licensing
has been proposed by Professors Peter DiCola and Matthew Sag. See DiCola & Sag, supra
note 55, at 242 (citing the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal as an example of "the way that
government involvement can spur private negotiations toward a solution").
217 Id. at 227.

218 As discussed, the key to using uncertainty to increase efficiency is one of degree.
Supra Part III.C.1.
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this brand of gamesmanship by introducing uncertainty in a way that
affects both parties. In the case of Clear Channel and Big Machine,
for example, both parties are risk averse and gain from removing
themselves from the uncertainty surrounding a future, unknown
terrestrial performance rate.
Through the use of bounded uncertainty, penalty default licenses
work to bring licensees and licensors to the bargaining table without
exacerbating existing inequalities. A privately determined rate will not
establish an industry norm unless it serves the needs of a majority of
the participants. In the case of a penalty default license, those who are
not served by it will still have the statutory rate to fall back on and so
are in no worse a position than under the status quo, 219 as they retain
guaranteed access to content. Proliferation of more efficient private
deals has the added benefit of reducing the transaction costs
associated with private ordering by establishing a template which may
require only minor tweaking from deal to deal. This may allow even
smaller, less powerful parties to eventually enjoy the same efficiency
gains as larger, more powerful players.
The Clear Channel-Big Machine deal raises concerns about yet
another form of gamesmanship: rights accretion. In his work on
intellectual property rights, Professor James Gibson suggests that risk
aversion can lead to unnecessary rights creation where parties,
uncertain about whether or not a particular license is required for a
particular use, seek unnecessary licenses until the procurement of
those licenses becomes an industry norm. 220 Gibson identifies
"[u]ncertainty regarding the reach of intellectual property
entitlements" as a key factor leading to unnecessary licensing and thus
rights accretion for copyright owners. 22 1
The establishment of a terrestrial performance right in the deal
between Clear Channel and Big Machine might at first glance seem to
present an example of this. Big Machine is being paid for an
intellectual property right to which it is not legally entitled, and the
219 To be sure, the adverse selection concerns discussed in Part II.B.2.b apply, but they
are inherent in any nonmandatory statutory licensing regime and do not compromise
access (although they may, in the long run, compromise the quality of that access). Making
the statutory license compulsory is the only way to completely avoid this brand of adverse
selection. The question of whether the overall gains resulting from elimination of adverse
selection concerns outweigh the efficiency losses resulting from the elimination of private
ordering-or whether some other solution might be preferable-is left for future work.
220 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (discussing how the combination of "doctrinal gray areas
and . . . the risk aversion that pervades key copyright industries" results in "a practice of
securing copyright licenses even when none is needed").
221 Id. at 942.
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convention is rapidly spreading in the industry.222 Closer inspection,
however, reveals an important distinction: There is no uncertainty
regarding the nonexistence of a terrestrial performance right. It is, in
fact, precisely its certain nonexistence that makes it such a valuable
bargaining tool. 223
While uncertainty has been shown to correct for gamesmanship
stemming from inequality in bargaining power by presenting an
unpalatable option to both licensees and licensors, it is less capable of
addressing concerns about gamesmanship stemming from private
action's influence on industry norms and customs. Still, there are steps
that can be taken to help ameliorate some of these concerns. First, a
statutory requirement of full disclosure surrounding a private
valuation may help alleviate misrepresentation of so-called "market"
rates. 224 In addition, Professor Jennifer Rothman has proposed
consideration of several factors in determining the legitimacy of a
custom in intellectual property. These include "the certainty of the
custom, the motivation for the custom, the representativeness of the
custom, how the custom is applied (both for what proposition and
against whom), and the implications of the custom's adoption." 225
Application of these factors to a proposed "market" rate for
terrestrial performance royalties might also help alleviate the
potential for the gaming of industry norms. For example, recognition
of the strategic motivations behind the Clear Channel-Big Machine
deal, in particular the desire to influence the future statutory rate to
the disadvantage of differently situated competitors, cuts against the
legitimacy of their private rate as a "market" rate. Demonstration of
broad proliferation of the deal terms, on the other hand, supports the
case for the private rate's adoption. On balance, the application of
Rothman's factors may help ensure that a private rate is not mistaken
for an industry norm.

222 For further reading on the copycat deals signed since the announcement of the
original Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
223 That said, rights accretion may occur where uncertainty impacts one party more
strongly than another (a scenario deemed otherwise acceptable). See supra note 220
(noting that rights accretion does not necessarily leave the affected party worse off). While
outside the scope of this Article, future work on adverse selection will attempt to address
this concern.
224 See Garcia, supra note 12, at 35-37; see also supra Part II.B.2.b (suggesting a
statutory amendment to require full disclosure of terms and circumstances surrounding
presentation of an alleged "market" rate).
225 Rothman, supra note 118, at 1967-68.
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3. Sources of Uncertainty

This Article has focused on uncertainty about the future state of
the law and future digital business models, but there are many
possible sources of uncertainty. As technological development is both
constant and unpredictable, technology itself frequently perpetuates
uncertainty in various industries. 226 In addition to changing business
models and consumer preferences, "technological innovation affects
social norms," which, like defaults, tend to be sticky. 227 Peer-to-peer
file sharing demonstrates the magnitude of this effect: By the time the
DMCA was passed in 1995, societal norms around file sharing were
already firmly entrenched, thereby challenging the law's ability to
effectively regulate that type of behavior. 228
Government intervention can also introduce uncertainty. Such
intervention can be indirect, as in the case of CROs, where the
government permits their formation and then approves their
operation within designated parameters (such as a consent decree).
Once formed, licensors are not guaranteed a fixed rate, much less a
portion of a blanket license. Royalty accounting under PROs like
ASCAP and BMI is notoriously poor, not to mention subject to a
complicated pooling calculation that often leaves smaller licensors
unpaid. 229 Moreover, licensees are not even guaranteed the content
for which they bargain. For example, Sony/ATV's withdrawal from
ASCAP makes the latter's catalog inherently less valuable and
requires licensees to expend additional time and money to directly
license that content. 230 Government intervention can also be direct,
226 See Depoorter,supra note 21, at 1836 ("[T]echnology, by creating an environment of
rapid and unpredictable change, establishes two major conditions that have a profound
effect on copyright law: legal delay and legal uncertainty."); DiCola & Sag, supra note 55,
at 180 ("[T]he arrival of new technology almost invariably creates legal uncertainty,
market instability, or both . . . . New technologies . . . expose uncertainties and

inadequacies in the existing legal regime.").
227 Depoorter, supra note 21, at 1837.
228 See, e.g., Christopher Jensen, Note, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the
Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 564 (2003)

(pointing out the DMCA's unintended effect of "widen[ing] the existing gap between
copyright law and copyright norms, further weakening the law's norm-reinforcing
function").
229 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, How ASCAP Takes Money From Successful Indie Artists
and Gives It to Giant Rock Stars, TECHDIRT (Mar. 26, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/ 2 01 2 03 2 3/18055718229/how-ascap-takes-money-successful-indie-artists-givesit-to-giant-rock-stars.shtml (describing the "unfair practices of collections societies").
230 One such licensee, Pandora, has sued. See Paul Resnikoff, Pandora Is Now Suing
ASCAP to Lower Songwriter Royalties. . ., DIGITAL Music NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012), http://
www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/11/06/ascap (discussing Pandora's lawsuit
against ASCAP over performance royalties). In a recent decision, the Southern District of
New York held for Pandora, finding "Pandora is correct that 'works' means musical
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such as with the issuance of patents of uncertain scope. Penalty
default licenses exemplify yet another type of direct government
intervention, one which "might be able to facilitate, hasten, or
otherwise encourage a licensing deal." 231
The implementation of standards, as opposed to rules, is another
means of using uncertainty, insofar as they require interpretation and
circumstantial application, and their consequences, if any, are only
realized ex post. 232 The doctrine of unconscionability in contract law,
which deems unenforceable contracts found to be "unconscionable"
at the time of formation, is an example of a standard. 233
The literature on rules versus standards tends to focus on when
lawmakers should implement one or the other. 234 Professor Ian Ayres
has noted that this debate focuses on immutable rules, as opposed to
default rules, since it "has largely ignored how the choice between
rules and standards is affected by the ability of private parties to
contract around the law." 235 In the default context, standards can be
circumvented just as rules can and may induce greater levels of optout on behalf of risk-averse parties who would prefer to contract
privately for a more certain result. Standards also better
accommodate evolving technologies in the digital space.236
In the case of § 114, unpalatability comes not only from rate
uncertainty but also, interestingly, from excessive rate specificity.
Section 114 sets royalty rates for specific types of digital service
providers. 237 An example of this is Apple's new iRadio service.
Proffered license terms suggest that its business model does not fit
compositions and not rights with respect to those compositions." In re Pandora Media,
Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
231 DiCola & Sag, supra note 55, at 173.
232 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 605 (1992) (noting that "individuals tend to be less well informed concerning
standards" and that, relative to rules, standards "can better take advantage of information
available only ex post").
233 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (discussing the doctrine of
unconscionability and standards by which to assess contracts for unconscionability).
234 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1974) ("This article discusses the conditions under
which greater specificity or greater generality is the efficient choice and makes a
preliminary effort to appraise the efficiency of the choices actually made by the legal
process."); Kaplow, supra note 232, at 621 ("This Article provides an economic analysis of
rules and standards, focusing on the extent to which the law should be given content before
individuals act (rules), rather than waiting until afterward (standards).").
235 Ayres, supra note 25, at 2.
236 See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 21, at 1863 ("To some degree, the unpredictable
nature of technology simply necessitates open-ended standards in copyright law.").
237 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), (f)(1)-(2) (2012).
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§ 114's definition of a webcaster, such that the company is instead
engaging in private dealmaking directly with rights holders. 238
While not without its faults, one of the reasons private ordering
often proves more efficient than statutory licensing is because ex ante
negotiation is cheaper than ex post litigation. Penalty default licenses
represent an optimal use of bounded uncertainty via government
intervention in the form of legislative threat. 239 Unlike uncertainty
stemming from technological development or changes in consumer
behavior, for example, uncertainty about the future state of the law is
generally a one-shot concern with plenty of lead time, 240 thereby
justifying the expense of avoiding it.

IV
UNCERTAINTY RECONSIDERED

A.

A Statutory Default

As discussed, a penalty default license is a circumventable
statutory license imbued with sufficient bounded uncertainty to make
it unpalatable to both licensors and licensees, such that they are
encouraged to circumvent the default and engage in private ordering.
This produces efficiency gains, while also minimizing gamesmanship.
Section 114's statutory license for sound recordings exemplifies this
brand of government-induced private ordering. 241
Section 114 contains an explicit authorization to circumvent. 242
This authorization eliminates the legal, and most challenging, barrier
to private ordering. Section 114 also sets no cumbersome
requirements to qualify for circumvention or language that a party
must include to signal an intent to circumvent, thereby lowering
238 For a discussion of the deal terms being offered by Apple to labels, see, for example,
Hannah Karp & Jessica E. Lessin, Apple Spells Out iTunes Radio Terms, WALL ST. J.
(June 26, 2013, 7:50 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/06/26/apple-spells-out-itunesradio-terms-for-record-labels/. Interestingly, the terms offered also demonstrate the power
of industry norms, as the proposed rate calculation already reflects the Clear Channel-Big
Machine revenue share model: "Apple intends to pay royalties to labels based on a blend
of how many times listeners hear their songs and how much advertising Apple sells." Id.
239 For more on the functioning of legislative threats, see generally Halfteck, supra note
76.
240 Congress will often hold multiple hearings well in advance of a vote on a particular
piece of legislation. Once that legislation is passed, however, so too is the time for
attempting to influence the resulting law.
241Professors Peter DiCola and Matthew Sag cite other examples of private action
brought about by government intervention, including blanket license agreements under
ASCAP and BMI and takedown notice and compliance procedures under the DMCA.
DiCola & Sag, supra note 55, at 182-83.
242 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1), (f)(3) (providing an explicit opt-out for licensors and
licensees of sound recordings).
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transaction costs further and working to alleviate the propensity of
default stickiness.
As demonstrated by the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, § 114
suffers inefficiencies that are readily improved upon by private
ordering. These inefficiencies form the basis of the statutory license's
unpalatability and give rise to its "penalty" default nature. Parties who
circumvent § 114 may enjoy a predictable rate tailored to specific
content and use, one not subject to the determinations of a rate court
or the whims of pending legislation or litigation. It is also one that
parties can cheaply and readily modify to accommodate new
technologies, business models, and consumer preferences.
Finally, § 114 suffers from rate fluctuation and variation in ratesetting standards. By affecting both licensees and licensors, this rate
uncertainty mitigates the tendency toward stickiness and minimizes
the potential for the type of anticompetitive gamesmanship and
opportunism that are born of notable discrepancies in bargaining
power. Significantly, the use of existing uncertainty does not
constitute the intentional making of "bad law." To the contrary, this
Article advocates leaving in place the "best" statutory license
possible, 243 then using controlled amounts of uncertainty to encourage
greater efficiency via private ordering. Using § 114 as a model,
legislators can improve efficiency in the statutory license for certain
types of copyright-protected content, while guaranteeing access and
mitigating the potential for gamesmanship by converting statutory
licenses into penalty default licenses through the use of bounded
uncertainty.
B.

The Importance of Defaults

This section seeks to illustrate the importance of coupling
uncertainty with a penalty default. It uses as an example one of the
uncertainty types found in the Clear Channel-Big Machine case study:
legislative uncertainty. One contemporary example of this brand of
uncertainty is the state-versus-local-law preemption debate taking
place in California, a state that has enacted laws permitting the
operation of medical marijuana dispensaries. The California Supreme
Court recently determined that those state laws do not trump local
bans on medical marijuana dispensaries. 2 4 4 In cities without such bans,
medical marijuana clinics are now uncertain whether or when local
243 Future work will consider the adverse selection effects that opt-out has on the
statutory license and those licensees and licensors left to its purview. For the purposes of
this Article, it suffices to keep the existence of adverse selection in mind.
244 See City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300
P.3d 494, 512 (Cal. 2013) (holding that California state law legalizing the sale and use of
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law may preempt their legal status, potentially shuttering their
businesses and forcing them to forfeit their investments. As a result of
this legislative uncertainty, the number of clinics operating in those
cities may be smaller than an efficient market would optimally
support. This is because prospective, risk-averse clinic operators may
opt out of starting up new businesses in the face of uncertainty about
whether they might be shut down in the future by the passage of local
legislation barring their existence. Thus, in the absence of a fallback or
default option, uncertainty about the future state of local marijuana
legislation may lead to market inefficiency.
A similar effect can be seen in the ongoing immigration debate.
The federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program, launched by the Obama administration as a stop-gap
measure until Congress passes immigration reform, defers deportation
for undocumented immigrants between the ages of fifteen and thirty
who came to the United States as children and who are either
currently in school or have graduated from high school. 245 However,
this has not prevented states like Arizona from denying deferredaction recipients the right to obtain a driver's license or to benefit
from paying in-state tuition.246 Despite the passage of an immigration
reform bill by the Senate in June 2013,247 resistance from the House of
Representatives has left the situation uncertain. 248 DACA students in
Arizona, for example, may opt not to enroll in college for fear that the
state's denial of tuition benefits might not be federally overruled,
leaving them with a larger-than-expected, and possibly larger-thanmanageable, tuition bill. Again, without a default to turn to,
uncertainty about the future state of immigration reform can lead to
inefficiency.
In both of these examples, uncertainty about the future state of
the law has predictably led to inefficiency in the absence of a default
or fallback option. If a medical marijuana clinic in California is shut
down by a future local law, its proprietor has no recourse. There is no
"security blanket" in the form of a default, such as that provided for

medical marijuana does not preempt the authority of California cities and counties to
allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude medical marijuana dispensaries).
245 Daniel Gonzalez, A Year Later, Immigrants Face DREAM Act's Limits, USA
TODAY (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/13/
a-year-later-immigrants-face-deferred-action-programs-limits/2651235/.
246 See id. (discussing Arizona's restrictions for DACA recipients).
247 See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Jonathan Martin, Senate, 68 to 32, Passes Overhaul for
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2013, at Al.
248 See id. (noting "firm House resistance to the Senate bill").
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sound recordings by the § 114 statutory license. 249 As a result, each of
these examples represents a suboptimal outcome stemming from
unbounded uncertainty. 250
In behavioral economic terms, uncertainty encourages efficiency
because individuals tend to be risk averse. They want predictable
outcomes, and they want to avoid loss. For this reason, people tend to
purchase insurance, wear seatbelts, vaccinate their children, and go
for annual medical exams-all results that, when acted upon,
maximize overall social welfare. As such, individuals can generally be
pushed toward more efficient outcomes as a result of a desire to avoid
an unpalatable alternative. As demonstrated in the next section,
penalty default licenses like § 114 show that the same effect is
achieved in the market context so long as there is both bounded
uncertainty and an unpalatable fallback.
C. Bounded Uncertainty
The so-called "negative IP space" 251 provides several examples of
the efficiency-enhancing. effects of bounded uncertainty coupled with
an unpalatable fallback. Despite the fact that tattoos are a form of
visual art, they exist in a legal gray area by nature of their unique
medium. While tattoos, or at least their line drawings, 252 are most
likely protected by copyright, so few infringement suits have been
brought 253 that there is uncertainty about the contours of both the
current and future state of the law. Are tattoos currently protected? If
249 Though it might sound odd, the fact that § 114 serves as an unpalatable default does
not preempt it from also serving as a security blanket. In the Clear Channel-Big Machine
case study, the statutory license's inherent inefficiencies make it unpalatable enough to
induce the parties to the bargaining table. But its existence allows the parties to
experiment with a one-off deal without having to commit to the terms vis-A-vis all business
partners.
250 Richard Craswell and John Calfee have suggested that a small amount of uncertainty
(i.e., "bounded" uncertainty) is most likely to lead to overcompliance, while broad
uncertainty (i.e., "unbounded" uncertainty) is more likely to lead to undercompliance.
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986).
251 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1764 (2006) (defining the
term "negative space" in the intellectual property context to describe areas without
adequate intellectual property protection).
252 While some templatized tattoos-generally referred to as "stock" or "flash"
designs-are drawn directly on the skin, most custom tattoos are first drawn on paper and
then transferred to the skin. The paper drawing is referred to as the "line drawing" because
it contains only the outline of the design. The tattoo artist fills in the shading, color, etc.,
freehand directly on the skin. Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MiNN. L. REV.
511, 526 (2013).
253 See id. at 530 ("Copyright suits between tattooers and their clients, or suits between
two tattooers, are virtually non-existent.").
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so, when? And will they be in the future? This uncertainty has led to
the establishment of private rules that have come to operate as
efficient industry norms.254 A party who is unhappy with a result
under the private norm regime has the murky copyright protection to
fall back on, but the scant case law demonstrates that this rarely
happens.
The same uncertainty can be seen in stand-up comedy, an
industry that enjoys only marginal and largely ineffective copyright
protection. In the face of this uncertain protection, comedians (like
tattoo artists) have developed a system of norms that efficiently
governs behavior in the industry. 255 These efficient private norms
function precisely because of the "threat" of alternatively leaving it to
the mercy of the unpredictable (i.e., unpalatable) copyright coverage
for the genre.
Most recently, copyright enforcement is benefiting from the use
of uncertainty coupled with a default. Uncertainty about the future of
antipiracy legislation, coupled with the highly unpalatable DMCA
notice-and-takedown regime (i.e., the penalty default), promises to
play an important role in the future of copyright enforcement. On July
15, 2013, the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator,
Victoria Espinel, 256 announced the Copyright Office's support for
private efforts to fight piracy, counterfeiting, and other forms of
copyright infringement. 257 To date, legislative efforts on this front
have proven ineffective and more effective results are being achieved
254 See id. at 591 (describing multiple purposes of the norms developed by tattooers,
including "protect[ing] both the relationship between tattooer and client and the
underlying assertion of personal sovereignty the tattoo represents," "preserv[ing] tradition
by encouraging the use of flash designs," "encourag[ing] innovation by protecting custom
designs from copying," and "giv[ing] tattooers valuable tools for cultivating market
demand for their services"); see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Flesh, Ink and
the Law, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2013, at A.31, available at http://www.latimes.com/opinion/
commentarylla-oe-raustiala-tattoo-copyright-20131006,0,3026228.story ("[I]f there's little
doubt that tattoo artists are entitled to copyright, it is far from clear what rights that should
give them over their creations.").
255 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual PropertyNorms and the Transformationof Stand-Up Comedy, 94
VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) ("[I]n stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for
intellectual property law.").
256 On August 13, 2013, Espinel stepped down to assume the reins at software industry
trade group BSA . Tony Romm, Former White House IP Adviser Victoria Espinel to Lead
BSA, POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/victoriaespinel-bsa-96015.html.
257 According to Espinel: "The Administration strongly supports voluntary efforts by
the private sector to reduce infringement and we welcome the initiative brought forward
by the companies to establish industry-wide standards to combat online piracy and
counterfeiting by reducing financial incentives associated with infringement." Victoria
Espinel, Coming Together to Combat Online Piracy and Counterfeiting, OFF. MGMT. &
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by private efforts, such as the Interactive Advertising Bureau's (IAB)
guidelines for digital advertising in the marketplace. 258 That proposal,
supported by technology companies such as Microsoft and Google,
seeks to cut off funding to known pirate sites by prohibiting the sale of
advertising inventory to sites known to "engag[e] in, promot[e] or
facilitat[e] illegal or legally questionable activities such as . .. online
pirating . . . as governed by United States Federal law." 2 59 The IAB

press release accompanying the proposal claims the guidelines provide
"brand safety assurances to advertisers that their ads will not appear
next to inappropriate content, including pirated intellectual
property." 260
Unlike the highly criticized Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA),
which had similar aims, 261 and unlike the DMCA, which has caused
more problems than it has fixed, 262 this private approach promises
greater efficiency. The University of Southern California's Annenberg
Innovation Lab "do[es] not believe that government regulation alone
is the answer to the Piracy problem, but rather that the self-regulation
of major sectors like the online advertising industry could make it
harder for the 'Kim Dotcom's' of the world to unfairly exploit

BUDGET (July 15, 2013, 8:33 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/15/comingtogether-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting.
258 See INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU, QUALITY ASSURANCE GUIDELINES 2.0 (2013),
available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/QualityAssuranceGuidelines7252013.pdf
(establishing guidelines that promote transparency in digital advertising transactions).
259 Id. at 28.
260 Press Release, Interactive Adver. Bureau, IAB Releases Quality Assurance
Guidelines 2.0 (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.iab.net/about theiab/recent-pressreleases/pressjrelease-archive/press release/pr-072513.
261 See H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) (defining the aims of SOPA as, inter alia,
"promot[ing] prosperity, creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the
theft of U.S. property"). For a summary of the free speech critiques against the bill, see, for
example, Trevor Timm, How PIPA and SOPA Violate White House Principles Supporting
Free Speech and Innovation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/01/how-pipa-and-sopa-violate-white-house-principles-supporting-freespeech.
262 For a recent sampling of the many examples of DMCA abuse, see, for example, Mike
Masnick, DMCA Copyright Takedowns to Google Increased 10x in Just the Past Six
Months, TECHDIRT (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121211/
16152021352/dmca-copyright-takedowns-to-google-increased-10x-j ust-past-six-months.
shtml (citing the number of DMCA takedowns received by Google in a single week as 2.5
million and pointing to the "abuses of the DMCA process" highlighted by Google's
Transparency Report); Mike Masnick, Microsoft Uses DMCA to Block Many Links to
Competing Open Office, TECHDIRT (Aug. 15, 2013, 7:33 AM), http://www.techdirt.coml
articles/20130814/17501024181/microsoft-uses-dmca-to-block-many-links-to-competingopen-office.shtml (calling Microsoft's use of the DMCA takedown process to remove
competitors' links "flat out censorship" and "abusing a legal process").
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artists." 263 To that end, the Lab issues a monthly "Advertising
Transparency Report" that tracks the companies whose advertising
funds pirate site operation, along with a sampling of brands whose
products are featured on those sites. 2 6 4 These brands include such
prominent names as LG, Verizon, and Visa. 265 According to director
Jonathan Taplin, this private effort asks, "Where is the money in this
business?"-an inquiry that has exposed companies like Google and
Yahoo!, which have consequently "changed their behavior quite
rapidly. "266
In the face of uncertainty about the future state of antipiracy
legislation, technology companies and content owners alike are
encouraged to engage in private ordering for more efficient results.
Copyright holders and technology companies today are uncertain
whether any new or additional antipiracy measures will be passed and,
if so, when that will be or what they might look like. Rather than wait
around for another SOPA or DMCA-i.e., the unpalatable fallback
option-parties are incentivized to engage in private negotiation for
more efficient, tailored terms. In addition, larger parties like Google
are encouraged to act early so as to set a baseline and encourage the
development of an industry norm that works for them.
Outside the copyright context, uncertainty in the form of
indeterminate patent validity has been suggested as potentially
"induc[ing] a limited amount of infringement that enhances social
welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the
profitability of the patentee." 267 The protection of the patent laws,
however uncertain in scope, serves as a fallback that allows for private
action-in this case, limited amounts of infringement-to result in
greater overall efficiency. Should the level of infringement exceed that
which a patent holder deems "limited," he has a recourse. The same is
263 USC Annenberg Innovation Lab, Online Advertising Transparency Report, http://
www.annenberglab.com/projects/ad-piracy-report-0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (quoting
monthly report).
264 See USC ANNENBERG INNOVATION LAB, ADVERTISING TRANSPARENCY REPORT
(5th ed. 2013), available at http://www.annenberglab.com/sites/default/files/uploads/
USCAnnenbergLab_- AdReportMay2013.pdf (listing the "top ten advertising networks on
illicit file sharing sites" and providing a sample of "major brands whose ads have appeared
on file-sharing sites").
265 Id.
266 Ad Transparency Report Focuses on Piracy Sites, USC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://
news.usc.edu/#!/article/49582/ad-transparency-report-focuses-on-piracy-sites/.
267 Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,
97 Micm. L. REV. 985, 986-87 (1999) ("Limited amounts of infringement combined with
increased patent duration . . . can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of
supra-competitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to
innovate.").
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true for the prospective patent infringer. The patent's validity is
indeterminate, so that he at least has a fallback argument that its
scope was unclear.
Expanding the concept still further, plea bargaining in criminal
cases provides another example of uncertainty's ability to encourage
more efficient private dealmaking. 268 The uncertainty in these cases
comes not only from uncertainty about the likelihood of conviction,
but also other prosecutorial variables (such as witnesses). In her work
on prosecutorial screening, for example, Professor Celesta Albonetti
finds that a decrease in uncertainty surrounding the credibility and
likelihood of cooperation of a witness is correlated with an increase in
continued prosecution. In other words, increased stability leads to a
less efficient outcome: trial. 269
These examples involve uncertainty, but the uncertainty is
bounded by the existence of minimal legal protection that serves as a
penalty default. Unlike the DACA student in Arizona who is without
an alternative legal recourse when her application for a driver's
license is denied, a tattoo artist whose designs are copied at least has
the option, albeit unpalatable, to sue should the industry's system of
social norms fail to protect his work. 270
Companies, like individuals, are risk averse. The existence of a
fallback option, even a poor one, allows them to take a chance on
private negotiation. This is the case because the parties know they
have an alternative should the deal not work out. Moreover, the
fallback allows them the freedom of dabbling in individual deals with
only one partner or a handful of them, affording valuable feedback on
which terms work and which ones do not without committing the time
and effort required to negotiate individually with all comers. If the
268 "Efficient" here simply means that rational parties have saved resources and reached
a mutual agreement. There is valid debate regarding whether this makes the conclusion
reached "better," or even desirable, for the accused or for society. See, e.g., Timothy
Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REG., Fall 2003, at 24 ("It is true that plea
bargaining speeds the caseload disposition, but it does so in an unconsitutional manner.").
269 See Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty:
Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processings, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (1986) (arguing that decreased uncertainty in case information
increases the probability of continuing prosecution).
270 An interesting counterexample is presented by the illegal drug trade, which also
faces uncertainty about the future state of the law without a legal default option and yet
has similarly used private agreements to establish efficient social norms. See STEVEN D.
LEVrrr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE EcONOMIsT EXPLORES THE
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 89-114 (2005) (discussing the economic organization of

drug gangs in inner cities). In the words of Levitt and Dubner, "a crack gang works pretty
much like the standard capitalist enterprise." Id. at 103. While outside the scope of the
current Article, there may be additional incentivizing effects stemming from potential
penalties that go beyond the financial, such as prison time.
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private terms prove functional and an industry norm begins to take
shape-as in the case of the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal-it can
then be extended to the larger, more comprehensive partners and
eventually reflected in the underlying legal regime.
CONCLUSION

When coupled with a penalty default, uncertainty can bring
greater efficiency to the marketplace by encouraging private ordering,
which allows for tailored terms and responsiveness to rapid
technological change. This is great news in the music sampling
context, where for years scholars, legislators, and industry players
have been debating a statutory license. 27 1 This Article suggests that a
penalty default license for samples, coupled with existing uncertainty
about the future state of protections for derivative works, might
alleviate efficiency concerns by encouraging more and better private
negotiation. 272
This prescription is particularly timely given the imminent rewrite
of "the next great copyright act," 273 and may find application outside
the United States as well. In the European Union, for example, there
has been a recent push for single-market licensing of intellectual
property rights. 274 Copyright territoriality has largely thwarted this
271 See, e.g., Ed Christman, Proposalfor Compulsory Remix License Has Foes in Steven
Tyler and Attorney Dina LaPolt, BILLBOARD (Feb. 10, 2014, 1:24 PM), http://www.
billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5901155/proposal-for-compulsoryremix-license-has-foes-in (describing Aerosmith and other artists' letters to the Patent and
Trademark office opposing compulsory licenses.
Joshua Crum, Comment, The Day the (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport, Sampling
Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008 BYU L. REV. 943 (2008) (suggesting a
failure of the copyright laws to adequately address digital sampling and arguing for a
compulsory sampling license); Ryan C. Grelecki, Comment, Can Law and Economics
Bring the Funk . .. or Efficiency?: A Law and Economics Analysis of Digital Sampling, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 328 (2005) (considering, inter alia, compulsory licensing as a
possible solution to the digital sampling problem).
272 This is markedly different from the current state of affairs, where content owners do
not have to license their content to anyone or may license only to licensees of their
choosing at whatever price they wish. See Howard, supra note 22 ("Any time an artist
desires to sample a work . . . the artist must negotiate with the rights holders, and the rights
holders can set whatever terms they want (or just deny the request all together).").
Unsuccessful licensees have no alternative recourse for access should their licensing efforts
fail. Introduction of a penalty default license, however, would guarantee licensees that
access, while motivating content owners to play ball.
273 The Register's Callfor Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, IntellectualProp. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
48 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office);
see discussion supra Part III.A.
274 See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Copyright: Commission Proposes Easier
Music Licensing in the Single Market (July 11, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseIP-12-772_en.htm (describing the European Union's Single Market music
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initiative, 275 whereas private ordering has resolved it. In November
2012, for example, Google accomplished something the European
Union has thus far been unable to: The company struck a private,
multiterritory agreement with thirty-five European countries. 276
Acknowledgment of the role uncertainty and penalty defaults
play in increasing effectiveness in the market for statutory licensing
and in copyright enforcement is only the beginning. A better
understanding of uncertainty as a tool for efficiency has application in
any industry facing change as a result of rapid technological growth,
evolving consumer preferences, or ambiguity about the future state of
the law.

licensing proposition); Frances Robinson, EU Aims to Ease Music-Licensing Rules, WALL
ST. J. (July 11, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB100014240527023039195045
77520721438682072.html.
275 Regardless of how wide or narrow the net of harmonization would be cast over
the laws of the Member States, and how rigorous the European legislature
would comply with its self-imposed principles of 'better lawmaking', this could
never remove the ultimate barrier to market integration: the territorial nature
of nationally defined copyright and related rights. Territoriality is the Achilles'
heel of the acquis.
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276 See, e.g., Darrell Etherington, Google Strikes Licensing Deal with European Music
Publishers, Gains Access to 5.5M Tracks Across 35 Countries, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 19,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/19/google-strikes-licensing-deal-with-europeanmusic-publishers-gains-access-to-5-5m-tracks-across-35-countries/.
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